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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the impact of collateral damage on the Taliban insurgency.  
It reveals the relationship between death of innocent civilians and the tribal concept of 
badal (revenge).  Research also analyzes Taliban propaganda leaflets to illustrate the 
compromise of popular support caused by collateral damage stemming from the 
Coalition’s tactics.  Research probes into the historical Anglo-Afghan wars and the 1979 
Soviet invasion to draw parallels to the current insurgency.  In doing so, it highlights the 
rising role of religion and FATA, Pakistan.  FATA is analyzed to show the effects of 
intrusions by outside actors as well as historical and recent events that have shaped the 
populace and structure of these tribal regions.  Lastly, the research concludes by offering 
non-kinetic solutions to curbing the Taliban insurgency. The solutions focus on FATA 
and offer socio-economic and political remedies to hinder with the Taliban recruitment 
efforts and cross-border incursions.  Thesis recognizes FATA and reduction in collateral 
damage as pivotal factors to fostering stability in the region. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.   PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the implications of kinetic and non-kinetic 
approaches to countering insurgency in Afghanistan.  The conflict which began with the 
aim to destroy and capture the Al-Qaeda leadership has transformed into a battle against 
the Taliban.  Thus far the U.S. military strategy has relied heavily on technology and 
troops to tame the asymmetrical tactics of the Taliban insurgents.1  However, this 
approach has failed to produce the end result envisioned at the commencement of 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  As the war approaches its seventh year, the Taliban 
operations continue to spark fear and concern for the stability of the entire region.   In 
lieu of the growing insurgency, a renewed effort must be devoted to understanding the 
Taliban mindset and the drivers which promote and sustain the insurgency.2   
As a consequence of the ongoing insurgency and terrorist activities, American and 
NATO forces are struggling to win the hearts and minds campaign, an element which has 
been compromised by collateral damage.  Loss of civilian lives associated with military 
strikes has played into the hands of the Taliban, in turn boosting their legitimacy and 
image while lowering U.S. credibility.  The unconventional methods of the Taliban have 
proven valuable in hindering with the stabilization of Afghanistan.  With regards to 
implementing an effective strategy towards Afghanistan, this thesis will outline the 
implications of the current strategy as it pertains to information warfare, culture, and 
people as the center-of-gravity in reducing the level of insurgents.3  Additionally, it will 
highlight the neglected social factors which have contributed to the success and 
recruitment of the insurgents.  In answering the primary purpose, the thesis will be 
centered on the following questions:  
                                                 
1 See Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan & the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, Maryland: 
Naval Institute Press, 2006.      
2 See Charles W. Kegley, Jr., The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, New 
Jersey:  Prentice Hall, 2003. 
3 See Sonali Kolatkar and James Ingalls, Bleeding Afghanistan, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006.  
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• How has Pashtunwali culture and tribal customs affected the insurgency? 
• How has collateral damage contributed to the Taliban propaganda campaign? 
• Where and how can the U.S. utilize non-kinetic approaches to address the 
underlying issues related to insurgency? 
B.  IMPORTANCE 
The United States faced a new enemy after the tragic events of September 11, 
2001.  With this new enemy also emerged the unconventional tactics of Improvised 
Explosives Devices (IED), suicide bombings, and a ruthless campaign of terrorist attacks 
against the public and military alike.  Despite the altered battlefield, U.S. tactics and 
strategies have remained largely unchanged.  As a military, United States continues to 
employ large scale conventional strikes, as well as air power, against an adversary that 
chooses to avoid a face-to-face battlefield environment.  The enemy, however, relies on 
guerilla-style tactics while drawing the U.S. into situations that increase the likelihood of 
collateral damage to infrastructure and civilians.  If the military does not alter its current 
strategy and tactics, the insurgents may not only emerge as the victors but the national 
security of the United States may be vulnerable to future terrorism.4  A defeat in 
Afghanistan may expose the vulnerabilities of American forces, carrying with it the 
potential to elevate the terrorists’ confidence and cause. 
C.  ANALYTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
The Taliban have become a powerful adversary in Afghanistan.  In order to 
understand the ideology of this enemy, one must peel back the Islamic and Taliban 
identities and delve into their Pashtunwali culture.5  Embedded in the Pashtunwali culture 
are concepts of honor and revenge, the very drivers which mobilize them against a 
                                                 
4 Future terrorism trends are outlined in Akorlie A. Nyatepe-Coo and Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted, 
Understanding Terrorism: Threats in an Uncertain World, New Jersey:  Prentice Hall, 2004.  
5 For a reference on culture, see Hafizullah Emadi, Culture and Customs of Afghanistan, London: 
Greenwood Press, 2005. 
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common foe.6  Moreover, viewing the ancient landscape and tribal ways of Afghanistan, 
it is conceivable why these concepts have maintained their luster over time.  
Consequences of these tribal customs were not only suffered by Alexander the Great but 
also by the British during colonialism of India, and later by Soviet Union in the 1980s.7  
In each case the will of the people as a center-of-gravity was ignored by the invaders.  
Ironically, Pashtunwali culture continues to be disregarded due an overwhelming reliance 
on technology and force as a means to stabilize Afghanistan.  Military confrontations “at 
opposite ends of the country signal a widening of the conflict and increasing confusion 
among western military officials over the enemy they are confronting.”8    
Over six years after embarking on Operation Enduring Freedom, the NATO 
forces are continuing to fight a resilient insurgency.  With Al-Qaeda leadership as elusive 
as ever, the Taliban have become the main enemy in Afghanistan.  Despite the kinetic 
tactics and state-of-the art technology at the Allies’ disposal, the insurgency seems to 
show no signs of weakening.  On the contrary, terrorist attacks are up “53 percent in 
Afghanistan, according to statistics compiled by the National Counterterrorism Center.”9  
Given these startling figures, growing criticism is being expressed at the national level 
with regards to failures in what began as the primary front on terrorism.   As the Taliban 
insurgency continues to gain strength, the overwhelming response by the officials and 
military leadership has been articulated through the need to deploy more troops.  Little 
emphasis has been devoted to the underlying causes that may be fueling the Taliban 
insurgency; cultural elements of the Pashtun tribes have been disregarded as they pertain 
to curbing the anti-U.S. sentiment and Taliban recruitment.10  Furthermore, hindering 
with the campaign of winning hearts and minds has been the ongoing collateral damage 
                                                 
6 Niloufer Qasim Mahdi, “Pukhtunwali: Ostracism and Honor Among the Pathan Hill Tribes,” 
Ethology and Sociobiology 7 (1986): 298. 
7 See Charles Allen, Soldier Sahibs: The Men Who Made the North-west Frontier, London:  Abacus, 
2000.  
8 Rachel Morarjee, “Anger as Afghan Clashes Spread Beyond Taliban Strongholds,” Financial Times, 
May 4, 2007, World News Section, London 1st Edition. 
9 Scott Shane, “Terrorist Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan Rose Sharply Last Year, State Department 
Says,” New York Times, May 1, 2007, A Section, Late Edition. 
10 See Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1980.  
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caused by the Allies.  More specifically, there appears to be a correlation between 
collateral damage and the level of insurgency.  
Current rhetoric and emphasis revolves around two areas of concern:  Countering 
Taliban insurgency and the role of Pakistan.  And “while Iraq continues to consume the 
administration's attention, U.S. officials are increasingly worried that the Taliban is 
making a comeback in Afghanistan, using parts of Pakistan to stage cross- border raids 
and undermine the authority of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.”11  Accordingly, the 
first step has been to stabilize and secure the country by increasing the military forces in 
Afghanistan.  “By most measures, there are still far fewer Afghan and foreign troops than 
are needed to secure the country.  With the increase, the total number of U.S., NATO and 
other Allied troops will be around 45,000, while there are about 40,000 soldiers in the 
new Afghan army.”12  Coupled with troop surge has been the necessity to bring the full 
effect of “kinetic weapons” to destroy the enemy while limiting the likelihood of 
collateral damage.13  The premise of the kinetics approach is based on the assumption 
that technological superiority and mass are adequate to crush the opposition, even though 
“the insurgents have largely sought to avoid full-on battlefield confrontations and instead 
relied on guerrilla-style tactics, including suicide attacks, roadside bombings and 
kidnappings.”14  Given the rugged terrain, lack of geographical familiarity, and lack of 
infrastructure, a troop surge will increase the scope of military operations while allowing 
for reconstruction efforts. 
Contrary to the issues pertaining to troop surge, concerns over Pakistan are 
political rather than military in nature.  Since the onset of war, blame has been expressed 
by both the Musharraf and Karzai regimes as to who can truly control the Taliban 
                                                 
11 Michael Abramowitz and Griff Witte, “Insurgent Activity Spurs Cheney Trip to Pakistan,” The 
Washington Post, February 27, 2007, A Section, Final Edition. 
12 “The Afghanistan Surge; Iraq is Not the Only Theater Where the Bush Administration is Belatedly 
Committing More Troops and Aid,” The Washington Post, February 1, 2007, Editorial Section, Final 
Edition. 
13 Benjamin C. Freakley, “Urban Counterinsurgency:  Seizing the Opportunity,” Infantry, 
January/February, 2005, 1-2. 
14 Laura King, “The World; Karzai, Musharraf Agree to Share Intelligence; After Months of Trading 
Blame, the Afghan and Pakistani Leaders OK Plan to Fight Extremists,” Los Angeles Times, May 1, 2007, 
Foreign Desk Section, Home Edition. 
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insurgents along the border areas.  “Afghanistan has accused Pakistan of sheltering 
Taliban leaders and fighters who cross the border to attack in Afghanistan. Pakistan has 
responded by saying it would fence and mine the border.”15  Additionally, Pakistan 
claims that root of the insurgency lies within Afghanistan and the Karzai government 
itself.16  Main criticism of the Karzai regime has been credited to its lack of authority 
within the state.17  Whatever the true realities and political strategies of the two 
neighboring regimes, the current discourse is centered on mistrust and discredit of the 
other.  With insurgents on the offensive, the border debates have taken on an international 
scope which not only affects the region but also the NATO forces involved in reshaping 
Afghanistan.   
While both issues address practical concerns in securing Afghanistan, neither 
focuses on the underlying causes of insurgency.  Additionally, the current approaches 
rely heavily on kinetic means, which in turn aid the Taliban propaganda and recruitment 
campaigns.18  Thus far kinetic means have not come without a heavy death toll for the 
civilians.  “The death of innocent civilians during operations - numbering more than 50 
by some accounts - has damaged trust and fueled resentment, pushing some into the arms 
of terrorists, according to observers.”19  According to Nader Nadery, vice president of the 
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, “the casualties are an easy propaganda 
tool for the Taliban to use in the affected areas.  People feel under attack by both sides.  
This does not win hearts and minds.”20  With military tactics unchanged and collateral 
damage as an acceptable outcome, the Allied strategy has neglected the Afghan people as 
                                                 
15 Abdul-Waheed Wafa, “U.N. Deputy Urges Pakistan to Curb Taliban,” New York Times, January 9, 
2007, A Section, Late Edition.   
16 Abul-Waheed Wafa, “U.S. Says Raids Killed Taliban; Afghans Say Civilians Died,” New York 
Times, May 1, 2007, A Section, Late Edition. 
17 Katrin Bennhold and Mark Landler, “Pakistani Premier Faults Afghans for Taliban Woes Along 
Border,” New York Times, January 25, 2007, A Section, Late Edition. 
18 See Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters),” 
Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September, 2007). 
19 David Montero, “Pakistan's Tribal Strategy; Pakistan's Prime Minister Met with Bush Tuesday to 
Discuss the War on Terror,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 25, 2006, World Section, All Edition.  
20 Pamela Constable, “Karzai Says Civilian Toll is No Longer Acceptable,” The Washington Post, 
May 3, 2007, A Section, Final Edition. 
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a center-of-gravity in winning the war.  The gap formed between the people and 
government continues to increase from the fear of becoming a casualty at the hands of the 
friendly forces and Taliban alike.21  Exacerbating the situation are the madrassa teachers 
who motivate students to wage Jihad for the injustices committed against the innocent. 
Haqqani madrassa (in NWFP) alone produces over 3000 graduates each year, whose sole 
purpose, in absence of other opportunities, will be to fight Jihad.22  In view of the Taliban 
propaganda campaigns and the negative public perception towards Allied forces, 
preventing collateral damage may be the critical node in diffusing the level of insurgency 
in Afghanistan. 
D.  METHODOLOGY 
To evaluate the impact of collateral damage on insurgency, this thesis will pursue 
a three-pronged analytic strategy.  First, the British (Anglo-Afghan wars) will serve as a 
case study to discover the compromises made by the Royal British military in the face of 
resistance.  After the second Anglo-Afghan war, the British had changed their forward 
policy to accommodate the tribal customs of Pashtuns under their area of governance.  
Among the new British policy was the creation of Paladins.  Paladins were experienced 
military officers who would adopt Pashtunwali culture as a means to govern their 
respective areas while allowing autonomy to the tribes.  As part of this new policy, 
kinetic means were secondary and implemented only if a violation or a contract had been 
breached by the tribes. Second, the thesis will analyze the Taliban’s information 
campaign vis-à-vis the U.S. campaign.  Third, current infrastructure and social problems 
of the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), Pakistan, will be studied to offer  
                                                 
21 Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Suicide Offensive; Face to Face with the Taliban's New Favorite 
Weapon in the Afghan War: Human Bomb,” Newsweek, May 14, 2007, 6.   
22 Ziauddin Sardar, “Pakistan: The Taliban Takeover,” New Statesman, April 30, 2007, 28.   
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non-kinetic approaches to reducing future insurgency.  Quality-of-life issues such as the 
lack of education and opportunities often leave no outlet for the growing youth but the 
madrassa schooling and the call of Jihad.  By shifting efforts to the neglected social 
aspects, the United States and Allies may win the campaign for hearts and minds while 
fostering long term stability in the region.  And even though FATA is merely one factor 
in the GWOT, it is absolutely crucial and pivotal to the security of both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.  Without addressing this rugged and ungoverned area, the Coalition’s 
efforts in Afghanistan may be subject to failure as the FATA offers an abundance of 
recruits and safe havens for the Taliban.  By addressing the previously ignored socio-
economic issues of FATA, the Coalition may drastically reduce the recruitment pool for 
future insurgents, thus curbing the Taliban insurgency and increasing the much-needed 
security to accomplish infrastructure building on both sides of the border. 
E. PASHTUNWALI (PASHTUN TRIBAL CODE) 
Even though subsequent chapters will explore Pashtun tribal code to address the 
research question, it is important to briefly discuss the Pashtunwali concept of nang and 
its significance to collateral damage.  Nang means honor.  It is the basic concept 
embedded in Pashtun tribal code.   Its core elements include badal (revenge), malmastia 
(hospitality), and nanawatey (refuge). Badal is often considered at the hierarchy of nang.   
Badal revolves around zan (women), zar (wealth), and zamin (land).  It may also be 
invoked to restore honor involving a loss of live.   Failure to restore honor may categorize 
the individual, family, or clan as beghairat (shameless; dishonorable; opposite of ghairat) 
and reduce the status within the respective tribe.   
F. THESIS CONTENT 
Having introduced the research question, its nuances and importance, the next 
chapter will probe into the history of warfare in Afghanistan.  The 19th and 20th centuries 
were full of turmoil for the Afghans.  Afghanistan experienced four major conflicts 
between the time-period of 1838 to 1989.  More generally, the earlier three conflicts are 
known as the Anglo-Afghan wars while the last one involved a Soviet invasion in 1979.  
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Initial two Anglo-Afghan wars and the Soviet invasion will serve as the basis for study.   
In each conflict collateral damage was a common theme.  By studying these three 
conflicts, the relationship between collateral damage and insurgency will be highlighted.  
By exposing the past mistakes or neglects towards the populace, valuable insights may be 
discovered to formulate future policies and strategies in Afghanistan. 
The third chapter will assess the military tactics of the United States and its 
Coalition in Afghanistan.  It will highlight the implications of collateral damage that 
stems from the aerial strikes.  The chapter will examine the impact of collateral damage 
on the Taliban propaganda as well as the anti-Western sentiment, with a special emphasis 
on the Pashtun concept of revenge (badal) and its relationship to the loss of trust by the 
populace.  American propaganda campaigns will also be compared vis-à-vis the Taliban 
in an effort to evaluate both information campaigns. 
The fourth chapter will assess and evaluate non-kinetic solutions for curbing the 
Taliban insurgency.  Instead of focusing on explicit policy prescriptions in Afghanistan, it 
will address the volatile region of FATA, Pakistan, since it has become a point of 
contention and blame between the two states.  In deference to similar strategies in the 
FATA, reconstruction resources and finances have been dedicated to stabilize 
Afghanistan.  The FATA, due to its structure and lawlessness, continues to be a source of 
support and recruitment for the Taliban and other extremists.  It may also be the center-
of-gravity for the overall stability of the region.  The chapter will identify socio-economic 
and political issues to improve the quality-of-life for the locals, thus reducing the pool of 
current and future recruits.    
The conclusion will summarize the implications of collateral damage on the 
Taliban insurgency.  It will reiterate the historical mistakes and their similarities to 
current tactics and military strategy.  It will sum up the necessity to approach the 
Afghanistan insurgency by stabilizing the FATA, a region which has traditionally 
supplied extremists with abundance of young recruits while playing an instrumental role 
in the creation of Taliban.   
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II. HISTORY AND WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The introductory chapter discussed the broader implications of collateral damage 
on the current Taliban insurgency.  This chapter will explore the history of warfare in 
Afghanistan.  It will analyze two of the three Anglo-Afghan wars as well as the Soviet 
invasion of 1979.  In doing so, collateral damage and nang (honor) violations will be 
highlighted to show their relationship to the past insurgencies faced by the invading 
forces.  Research will draw parallels to the present-day neglects of the Coalition, in that 
innocent civilian casualties and cultural violations lead to the creation of resistance 
movements that rally around the banner of Jihad (Holy War) in order to repel oppressive 
non-Muslim forces.  
The purpose of studying the Anglo-Afghan wars is to analyze the British 
military’s treatment and forward policies for addressing the locals.  By the second Anglo-
Afghan war, the British significantly modified their approach to governing the tribal 
areas and eventually abandoned their ruthless policies.  They implemented the concept of 
Paladin, with an emphasis on employing military officers who were well-versed in the 
Pashtun language, culture and tribal codes.   
After analyzing the British lessons and policies, the focus will turn to the Soviet 
invasion of 1979.  In exposing the Soviet approach, the emphasis will be on 
indiscriminate tactics and the radicalization of religion.  Unlike the British, the Soviet 
approach did not incorporate any diplomatic or cultural elements in addressing the 
insurgency that followed the invasion.  The role of ungoverned spaces will also be 
studied when addressing the Soviet invasion.  More specifically, the transformation of 
FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan) will come into view as it 
pertains to its strategic value for Afghanistan.  
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B. RELEVANCE 
In a place where landscape and culture have changed very little, American policy 
makers can learn important lessons from earlier historical Afghan conflicts  The 19th and 
20th centuries witnessed significant turmoil and foreign intervention in Afghanistan with 
the invading militaries suffering humiliating defeats despite having military superiority.  
The 19th century twice brought the British military to Afghanistan in order to exercise 
strategic depth stemming from fears of a Tsarist expansion.  Despite suffering heavy 
losses in the first war, the British carried out yet another war in 1879.  These two 
historical Anglo-Afghan conflicts are written as terrible times on part of the British.  A 
third Anglo-Afghan war also followed in 1919 but resulted in a stalemate, though not free 
of collateral damage.  Over sixty years later, in 1979, the Soviets invaded the countryside 
and discovered a similar fate.  After ten years of bloody fighting the Soviet forces 
retreated after suffering greatly at the hands of guerilla-style tactics.  Some call this 
bloody ordeal the Soviet Union’s Vietnam War; the outcome resembled the American 
involvement in South-East Asia.  In each of the three Afghan conflicts, one element was 
constant:  The militaries were initially able to overwhelm the locals yet suffered at the 
hands of insurgents motivated through concept of Jihad.  Moreover, in all three conflicts 
the insurgencies ensued following the indiscriminate collateral damage and nang 
violations caused by the invading forces. 
The history of Afghan conflicts warrants a closer look to expose mistakes that 
may have been repeated earlier.  This may shed some light on the eventual outcome of 
the present conflict in Afghanistan.  Similar to the current involvement in Afghanistan, 
the past conflicts also sparked resilient insurgencies.  Additionally, the conventional 
methods and military superiority of the invading forces could not yield success in 
reducing or eliminating the fierce insurgencies which ensued after the invaders had 
successfully entered Afghanistan. And likewise, people’s role as the center-of-gravity 
was downplayed when contending with the resistance, ignoring the very nature of 
insurgencies.  Whereas insurgencies have a political nature as well as a military wing, the 
past conflicts will reveal that sole reliance on kinetic means only addressed half of the 
problem and led to further cultural violations.  
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C. ANGLO-AFGHAN WARS 
1. First Anglo-Afghan War 
The first Western military to clash with the culture and people of Afghanistan was 
the British army.  Having brought the Mughal rule to an end, the British were a well-
established colonial power in the region.  Claiming India as its Crown Jewel, Britain was 
at the height of its empire in South Asia.  Having territories in then Hindustan (Pakistan, 
India, Bangladesh), the fertile lands were of great importance to the economy of Great 
Britain.  With America having gained independence, British India was perhaps its only 
rich colony worth holding onto.  Fortunately the geography and environment of this area 
favored this hold since the rugged mountains of the Himalaya and Hindu Kush served as 
natural barriers to the North and West while thick jungles created a natural obstacle to the 
East.  Despite the natural barriers and the vastness of British Raj, the region was not 
immune to landward invasions.  Long before the British, the first wave of Mughal 
invasion marched into India from the Khyber Pass (current North West Frontier Province 
of Pakistan) and created an empire that lasted for over two centuries.  During the 1800’s, 
with Russian Tsarist expansion into the Central Asia, Afghanistan served as a crucial 
buffer between the two empires and became an area of concern for the British.  Russia 
too realized the value of the buffer state.  The Anglo-Russian competition to win-over the 
Afghan rulers through diplomacy and foreign policy became known as the “Great 
Game.”23  Each realized that having the Afghan favor would facilitate the preservation 
and possible expansion of the respective empire.  However, it was the Russian envoy 
which proved successful in winning the diplomatic relations with the Afghan ruler.   
Realizing the implications of the Afghan-Russian cooperation, British perceived 
an eventual thrust by the Russian military into the colonial area of influence and 
geography.  However, many scholars believe there were no such plans on part of the 
Russians and that such fears were exaggerated by the British to serve as excuse for 
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further expansion to the West.24 Nonetheless, in 1838 British embarked on a military 
campaign to take Kabul.  Not only did the British plans involve control of Kabul but they 
also intended to replace the political leader with a person who would prove friendly to the 
British government.25  With an estimated 16,500 troops from the Indus area, the British 
were able to march into Kabul and erect a puppet leader (Shah Shuja) by 1839.   
The march into Kabul proved to be an easy task for the British.  However, in 
November 1841 a massive rebellion ensued in Kabul, resulting in the eventual death of 
Shah Shuja.  Evidence credits this resistance to the harsh British treatment of the locals as 
well as ruthless tactics and nang violations. According to memoirs of General Harlan (an 
American living in Afghanistan until the British invasion), “the British settled in, 
importing foxhounds, cricket bats, amateur theatricals and all the appurtenances of 
empire.  After an easy victory, it was assumed that the Afghans were docile.  The 
invaders rode roughshod over the local culture, treating the Afghans with disdain, 
oblivious to the growing rumble of discontent.”26  Additionally, the Afghans resented the 
deployment of Hindu troops to control a Muslim populace.27  Due to inter-tribal fighting, 
anti-Islamic environment, and violations of tribal codes, “the Afghans resented the 
foreign conquerors and began guerilla warfare against the British.  The remaining English 
forces withdrew at the end of 1842.”28  The aftermath was a retreat which concluded in a 
bloody massacre as the army withdrew back into British controlled territories.  On the 
narrow journey through the five-mile Khurd Kabul pass, the soldiers were picked off one-
by-one by Gilzai snipers who had taken higher ground; the incidence was a massacre.29  
“According to the late Louis Dupree, the premier historian of Afghanistan, four factors 
contributed to the British disaster: the occupation of Afghan territory by foreign troops, 
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the placing of an unpopular emir on the throne, the harsh acts of the British-supported 
Afghans against their local enemies, and the reduction of the subsidies paid to the tribal 
chiefs by British political agents.”30 
The British did not take this shameful defeat lightly and returned to take 
vengeance on the Afghans.  In 1842, following the incidents of first Anglo-Afghan war, 
“in every region where British or Indian troops had been killed or maltreated, the male 
inhabitants were shot, bayoneted or put to the sword in the name of ‘signal punishment’, 
and their houses fired...no males above fourteen years were spared, and some of the men 
(brutes except in form) wanted to wreak their vengeance on the women.”31  Such mass 
punishment not only enraged the Afghans but it violated many deeply-held customs like 
nang (honor) and invoked badal (revenge or vendetta).  This incident was hailed as a 
heroic effort on part of the British troops who, in one British Army officer’s words, 
carried out these courageous actions and formed “one of the most glorious pages in 
English history;” in the same 1879 article, this officer described revenge as a “virtue” for 
the Afghans.32   
2. Second Anglo-Afghan War 
No sooner had the lessons from first war faded that British carried out a second 
military campaign in 1879.  With Anglo-Russian tensions as predominant as before, 
British hoped to gain the subordination of Afghanistan as well as strategic territories.  
“Initial successes were followed by the massacre of the British mission in Kabul in 
September 1879.”33  Following the burnings and killings of British residents in Kabul, 
the British army sought retribution.34  A British Corps of over 36,000 marched in and 
seized Kandahar and Kabul with the sole purpose of punishing the Afghans.  Just as 
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before, marching in to Kabul proved an easy task.  Again the invaders outlook was 
unchanged; the British viewed the Afghans as savages and inferiors while overlooking 
the local reactions which may stem out of badal.  And despite having witnessed the 
culture and tribal codes of the Afghans 40 years earlier, the British engaged in similar 
behavior as it pertained to disregard for collateral damage and tribal codes.  During the 
next four weeks following the arrival into Kabul, “the British executed about 100 
Afghans with little regard as to whether or not they had been directly involved in the 
assault on the residency.  One senior officer noticed that `we are thoroughly hated and not 
enough feared'.”35 
The result, however, was no different than the previous war in that a rebellion 
erupted and led to an insurgency; British troops in Kabul were overtaken by over 100,000 
Afghan rebels.36  This embarrassing defeat, once again, led to the withdrawal of the 
British.  In the end, British gained the geographic high-grounds to include the passes into 
Afghanistan.  The foreign matters of Afghanistan also fell under the control of the British 
as a compromise to the initial desires.  From the Afghan point of view, the incident was 
merely fuel for the already burning flames from the first Anglo-Afghan war; hatred only 
intensified.  And even though a formal Afghan military was in disarray, the locals 
continued to resist the British in many regions.  The extent of the Afghan hatred at the 
conclusion of the second Anglo-Afghan war can be summed up by Rudyard Kipling’s 
famous words regarding the role local women on the battlefields:37 
When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains.  And the women 
come out to cut up what remains.  Jest roll to your rifle an' blow out your 
brains.  An' go to your Gawd like a soldier. 
3. British Lessons 
Early lessons of the British involvement in Afghanistan revolve around the 
delicate balance between culture, religion and politics.  Islam, unlike Christianity, does 
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not have a wide margin between the so-called “separation of church and state.”  For a 
country that had suffered many waves of invasions throughout history, ranging from 
Alexander the Great to Mongols and Mughals, the people of Afghanistan maintained 
their ancient tribal ways, religious values, and remained in a state of turmoil with respect 
to political and economic development.  And while Islam was a large part of the Afghan 
society, the type of Islam practiced was mainly Sufism (Mystic) and Hanafi school of 
thought; generally moderate and of open interpretation.  The first Afghan war insulted 
tribal customs and gave the Afghan tribal warriors a justification for Jihad.  Since the 
invaders were armed and had occupied Muslim territories, according to Islamic school of 
thought a military reaction was justified to end the oppressions of the invading army.   
This logic is embedded in Dar-ul-Salam (state of peace) and Dar-ul-Harb (state of war). 
According to this belief, a Muslim state remains in a state of peace unless conditions 
warrant a change to a state of war.   A declaration of Dar-ul-Harb justifies the use of 
force and makes it incumbent upon the citizens to take up an armed struggle on the 
directive of the state.    
By the second Anglo-Afghan war, British began to experience the infusion of 
religion and politics deeper than before.  The insults of the two wars combined magnified 
the anti-British resentment.  In the political void created through interferences by the 
British, clergy began to play an active role.  Anyone catering to or aiding the mission of 
infidels/disbelievers would be viewed as no less than the perpetrators themselves.  
Traditionally, even the elected leaders (through succession and dynasty) required the 
blessings of the clergy to legitimize their power.  To gain this legitimacy, rulers would 
seek the most influential religious figures to perform the religious blessing; a ritual 
conducting by tying a White turban on the leader followed by recital of Qur’an.38 Clearly 
a puppet leader at the service of the British would have been an illegitimate ruler. In the 
case of British-friendly emirs in Kabul, the tribes treated them as lacking legitimacy. 
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The political vacuum pulled the religious figures into a broader role as they led 
the call to Jihad in the face of British atrocities and began to exercise leadership beyond 
the scope of clergy duties.   The current century is not unique to the interference of clergy 
into politics and battlefields.  The mosque leaders were among the first to voice the 
banner of Jihad, carry out recruitment campaigns, and even fight along side the 
military.39  In essence, such acts resembled the early Islamic Caliphate period when the 
political and military power was vested in one person, a person who would not only lead 
men in prayers and battles but would also preside over political and judicial matters.  
Unintentionally, the British had started a religious revival where the populace longed to 
emulate the early years of Islam and reverted to a deepened Muslim identity, the kind that 
would unite the masses while rationalizing badal as justice.  The colonial interference in 
other Muslim states may have also contributed to the belief that Islam was under attack. 
While inciting religion held its share of the dangers during the first Anglo-Afghan 
war, the period after the second war managed to frustrate the British authorities even 
further.  The British would call the perpetrators “Mad Mullahs” but to the locals these 
personalities were known as Hadda Sahib and Saidullah (Mad Fakir).40  These figures 
were believed to have possessed miraculous, un-Earthly powers.  Their legends and anti-
colonial rhetoric spread throughout the country and served as a source of spiritual 
inspiration for many uprisings against the British.  But none would take the British on a 
“wild-goose” chase as did the Fakir of Ippi (born Mirza Ali Khan), who declared Jihad in 
the mid 1930s, conducting raids and ambushes, and eluded scouts and authorities for over 
24 years by hiding in the caves of Waziristan.41  “More than 40,000 troops and £1.5 
million in one year were expended on tracking the religious zealot.”42  Resistance of the 
British, and later the Pakistani authorities (following the 1947 partition), validated his 
supernatural powers in the eyes of many who spread his legendary stories long after his 
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death as a free man in 1960.  Exposing such incidents are very relevant to contemporary 
times:  Danger exists that Osama bin Laden’s defiance against America may boost him as 




Figure 1.   Faqir of Ipi 
4. Concept of Paladin 
Although the British were driven through conquest and inferior views of their 
subjects, not every one in the ranks shared these outlooks.  After the bloody 
consequences of the two wars, the British forward policies began to shift.  While the 
British continued to maintain military presence via forts in certain regions, the local tribes 
were allowed self-governance according to their tribal ways.  Tribal leaders 
(Khans/Maliks) would be rewarded with monetary or valuable goods for their 
cooperation; lack of cooperation or resistance would bring about a military 
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involvement/interference.43 Even though this policy was a positive step towards 
Afghanistan, the British continued to face resistance by the Pashtuns, the ethnic identity 
which was at the center of contention during the wars.  Most of this resistance transpired 
in what is now the Northwest Frontier region of Pakistan (NWFP).  
In light of these ongoing tensions, there were a select few who would uphold the 
forward policy undertakings of the British Raj by virtue of their personalities and 
experiences.  These select few came to be known as the British Paladins.  The role of a 
Paladin encompassed the control of the NWFP area under his jurisdiction.  The Paladins 
not only went as far as to learn the local language but they also understood the tribal 
customs of Pashtunwali.  Many even began to dress and look like the locals. This insight 
aided the Paladins in running their day-to-day affairs with some level of ease.  For 
instance, it was imperative to get “cooperation of the tribal elders – the Khans who 
headed the various clans and the Maliks who were village chiefs” before any revenue was 
collected.44  This practice preserved the dignity and role of the elders, in turn gaining 
respect for their British authorities while lowering the likelihood of conflict.  It was also a 
step to eliminate further violations of nang and badal, reasons for the cause of conflict 
with the Pashtun tribes in the area.  
Unfortunately the era of such personalities was short lived in comparison to the 
duration of British Raj, leaving behind a positive mark in a fickle region of warriors who 
could not otherwise be tamed.  The Paladin model, though over one century old, has great 
relevance to contemporary issues of winning favor in Afghanistan.  The Paladin’s 
modern-day equivalent may best be the military’s Foreign Area Officer program with one 
stark difference, in that a Paladin remained in country for an extended period of time to 
fully immerse into the local community, language, and cultural norms.  Given the contact 
society of the Afghans, physical presence was an important necessity to form alliances 
and build a reputation among tribal leaders.  Winning the respect of the locals amounted 
to cooperation and even assistance in civil/military matters that could not otherwise be 
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agreed upon, in turn lowering the chances of military escalation.  But most importantly, 
the presence formed trust between the locals and the foreign officers.  Willingness of the 
tribes to fully accept Westerners was most profoundly achieved twice during the 
nineteenth century.  First it was achieved by General Harlan, an American-born who had 
been living in Afghanistan for twelve years and was appointed “commander-in-chief of 
the Afghan Army by Dost Muhammad Khan, the mighty emir of Kabul.”45  Second, it 
was achieved by the British Paladins who would come to be known as “the daring 
adventurers who tamed India’s Northwest Frontier.”46  Both of these remarkable feats are 
credited to the knowledge and acceptance of tribal customs and codes of Pashtunwali. 
D. SOVIET INVASION OF 1979 
1. Soviet Approach 
Sixty years after the 3rd Anglo-Afghan war, a new invader entered Afghanistan. 
According to British government earlier in the century, the Russians needed to be 
deterred from an invasion, but for the 1979 Soviet Union regime the rise of Islam may 
have presented a danger and a catalyst for their motives in Afghanistan; Islamic 
fundamentalism had penetrated many figures in politics.  During 1978-79 Soviets 
attempted to promote moderate policies and showed a dislike towards radical figures in 
the government.47 As history reveals, 1979 was a period when Khomeini’s religious 
revolution overthrew the secular government of Shah.  To the East of Afghanistan a 
devout General, Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq, executed the secular Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and 
gave leverage to religious groups like the Jamat-e-Islami, whose founder Maulana Abu'l 
a'la Maududi (1903-1979) was instrumental in the concept of forming a model Muslim 
State (Pakistan).   
As with the British scenarios, marching into Afghanistan was easy but controlling 
the insurgency that ensued proved to be a challenging task.  Soviets intended to foster and 
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promote an environment that would be conducive to communism.  Like the British, 
Soviet role extended not only to crushing the opposition but to forming a puppet 
government.  Soviets brought to bear over 85,000 troops and some of the best technology 
to carry out a mission of what many characterize as an occupation from the very 
beginning.48  Men of the communist government of Afghanistan also joined the efforts of 
the Soviet military. Given the scale of invasion, Cold War alliances in the region, and the 
era of Islamization, rag-tag forces quickly formulated to repel the aggressors; neighboring 
Pakistan grew cautious with the presence of a superpower next door.  Pakistan’s premier 
intelligence agency, ISI, began to implement plans concerning strategic depth and 
security as the Soviet war machines rolled into the countryside and wreaked havoc.  
For the next 10 years Soviets would inflict a ruthless campaign of aerial and 
ground attacks on the countryside in order to control the growing insurgency.  The Soviet 
invasion encompassed a level of brutality and collateral damage that the Afghans had not 
seen before.  They displayed a total disregard for the tribal codes and religion. Wiping 
out entire villages with indiscriminate killings of women and children became a norm for 
the communist invaders as they chased the retreating guerillas into populated areas.  
According to one Soviet soldier’s testimony, killing innocent women, children, elderly, 
and even animals was a common practice in reprisal for a slain soviet soldier.49  In 1985 
alone, “Soviet troops in Afghanistan killed about 35,000 civilians…in a campaign of 
‘systematic brutality’ that included bombing villages and planting explosives in children's 
toys, a report prepared for the U.N. Human Rights Commission said.”50  The massive 
collateral damage and injustices against innocent civilians only reinforced the concept of 
Jihad and badal.  A call to Holy War once again fueled the anti-occupation resentments 
and summoned the men to wage battle against the Infidels.   
America also took an active role in providing covert financial and arms assistance 
via the Saudi and Pakistan channels.  However, it was the will of the Mujahideen (plural 
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for Mujahid; one who wages Jihad) that decided the fate of the invading army.  Foreign 
fighters also began to pour in and take part in what they deemed as religious duty for all 
Muslims.  Not only did the Soviet atrocities win support for the Mujahideen but the war 
hardened and radicalized local and foreign Muslims alike.  “In 1981 to1983, the number 
of armed combatants who were members of Afghan Mujahideen groups estimated at 
some 45,000 personnel.  By 1985, this number grew to 150,000.”51  “The Mujahideen 
understood that guerilla war is a contest of endurance and national will.  Battlefield 
victory is almost irrelevant, provided that the guerilla survives to fight the next of a 
thousand battles before passing the torch to his children.”52  Indeed the torch had been 
passed since the first Anglo-Afghan war. 
By 1986, Soviet Union decided to withdraw due to their inability to control the 
situation.  Economically and militarily, Afghanistan had consumed many resources 
without producing the envisioned goals.  Total Soviet casualties numbered 26000 with 
over 2900 Officer deaths.53  The Afghan casualties numbered over 1.3 million while 1/3rd 
of the population became refugees,54 many of whom found a sanctuary in the already 
volatile regions of the FATA.  The defeat of the Soviet Union also lifted the spirits of 
Jihadis worldwide.  “Rather than disband and go home, thousands of Afghan veterans felt 
so empowered by having defeated one of the world’s superpowers that they embarked on 
new militant adventures.”55 The weaknesses of the superpowers had been captured in 
their reliance on conventional warfare whereas insurgencies relied on guerilla tactics to 
avoid full battle confrontations.  The abandonment of the Mujahideen after the Soviet 
withdrawal may have also exacerbated the radicals’ views towards America as yet 
another manipulator of the Afghan scenario.   
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2. Role of FATA  
The discussions on Soviet invasion could not be complete without addressing the 
role of ungoverned spaces with broken socio-economical conditions, more specifically 
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  The Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border (Durand Line) created by the British divided the Pashtun population on both sides 
of the border.  From the surrounding Pashtun residents’ (on both side of the border) point 
of view, Durand Line is a virtual border and is trespassed across freely, without any legal 
document or passport.  However, from the Pakistani perspective it is an official border 
which must be guarded by military presence, if necessary.  This precise mentality of the 
Pashtun residents made this area an oasis for retreat and re-supply during the Soviet 
invasion.  In conjunction with the Pakistani support, this was an ideal location to man, 
train, and equip the Mujahideen; an area which the Soviets could not cross without 
sparking official involvement of the international community.  The proximity of Kabul to 
the surrounding rugged mountains at the Durand Line made entry into Afghanistan 
inconspicuous and tactically efficient.  When applying the hit-and-run tactics, the 
geography and local familiarity proved beneficial with friendly provisions not far from 
many scenes of fighting.  Making the area further suitable to the cause was the Pashtun 
loyalty to their tribes and families to the West, who were then engaged in a bloody war 
with a non-Muslim aggressor.   
 23
 
Figure 2.   Ethnicity Map 
During the period of 1980s, FATA became the gateway for many Jihadis’ entry 
into Afghanistan.  It not only facilitated an influx of religious madrassas to generate new 
recruits but also incorporated guest houses to prepare and indoctrinate new militants.  
Osama bin Laden too contributed to a guest house, known as the Services Bureau, which 
became instrumental in the early phases of Al-Qaeda.56  Presence of Arab fighters 
coupled with Saudi funding paved the way for induction of Wahabi ideology into key 
madrassas; the region previously followed moderate school of thought and jurisprudence.  
As with any movement, funding and logistics support were sufficient to transform and 
mold a new generation of fighters who would later take on a life of their own by aspiring 
for political positions in Afghanistan.  After the Soviet retreat, Mujahideen groups turned 
on each other to gain a role in governance, a reward for many years of sacrifice and 
bloody fighting.  Unfortunately, the fundamentalists, due to massive support during war 
years, would have the upper hand while the moderates would prove to be no match for 
the new wave of atrocities in the name of religion. 
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3. Mujahideen 
Soviet-Afghan war served as the final blow to moderate religious groups.  Even 
though many Mujahideen groups and tribes had taken up arms against the Soviet, the 
selection process of foreign supporters eliminated the moderates by favoring the 
extremists and fanatics.  After all, they could best get the job done due to their belief in 
militant Islam.  All three aiding states (America, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan) had a hand 
in making this possible.57  From a realist perspective an able group needed to be selected 
to receive the aid.  For inflicting damage to America through support of North 
Vietnamese, it was a strategy to create a Vietnam War for the Soviets.  From the Saudi 
perspective, the group had to fit the Wahabi brand of Islam.  Due to Saudi 
Wahabism/Salafi practices, receiving group had to have a similar belief system; literal 
belief in the Qur’an with no room for speculation or deviation.  Shias and Sufis, 
especially, did not fit these criteria since these groups are often termed as Kafirs (non-
believers) by Wahabis.  As for Pakistan’s role, the reasons were more practical since it 
had much to lose through a possible Soviet aggression or another round of tensions over 
Pashtunistan (a separate land for the Pashtuns, to be carved out of FATA).  These fears 
may have been compounded since USSR was a Cold War ally of India; the strategic 
encirclement carried the potential of a two-front conflict for Pakistan.  As events would 
unfold, General Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq assumed power through a military coup and 
rapidly began to implement Islam into the Pakistani society.  With the coincidental timing 
of the Iran revolution and Soviet invasion, Zia felt “destiny had called him to serve 
Pakistan, to bind up its wounds, and to prepare for the nation for the struggle that lay 
ahead.”58 Advocated by Zia, bulk of the aid went to Hikmetyar and some to Masud, both 
of whom had “participated in an unsuccessful uprising against President Mohammed 
Daud in 1975.  These figures had then fled to Pakistan where they were patronized by 
Islamabad as a means to pressurize future Afghan governments.  Consequently when the 
Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan already had effective Islamic radicals 
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under its control which could lead to Jihad.”59  The task had begun earlier during 
Bhutto’s reign and intensified under Zia.           
4. Wahabi Influence 
Zia’s emphasis on religion led to the decline of the moderation promoted by 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, changing the dynamics of Pakistani politics as well as attitudes of 
the society.  This transformation also facilitated the alliance with Saudi Arabia.  During 
Zia’s 11-year reign, Saudi financing and projects boosted the efforts against the Soviets 
while introducing the Wahabi Islam to a region that had primarily followed a moderate 
school of thought.  It was a consequence Pakistan was willing to accept.  In addition to 
providing finances, Riyadh also agreed to provide cheap fuel, assistance for the influx of 
refugees, and numerous social and educational (madrassa) programs along the border 
areas as “gifts to the Afghan people from Saudi Arabia.”60  Though self-serving, the 
Saudi gestures were seen as noble acts and were welcomed by other religious actors in 
the FATA and NWFP who were then engaged in rallying for Jihad.  The type of 
education offered by the Saudi-sponsored madrassas also mirrored their religious 
ideology thus transforming an entire generation of youth who were distinct from the 
madrassa-attending generation before.   The overall effect resulted in transforming the 
ethos of FATA.  To the warriors, outside support legitimized what they believed to be a 
state of Dar-ul-Harb.  Simultaneously it also fueled the Pashtun warrior culture through 
arms supplies.  This ultimate call to Jihad, with even the non-Muslim powers advocating 
the struggle, was a moment of triumph both from the ideological point of view as well as 
from the perspective of tribal customs.  
Resources were not the only goods delivered to impress the populace. The Saudi 
government also encouraged its citizens to participate in repelling the Soviet Army from 
Afghanistan.  The wealthy Osama bin Laden was among the many who wished to offer 
his money for the cause.  In addition to supporting a guest house in Peshawar, Osama 
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also formed an Arab Army following his limited experience among the Mujahideen.61  
This band of Arabs would later be combined with the Egyptian hard-line ideology of 
Zawahiri to become Al-Qaeda.  Together, Osama and Zawahiri enjoyed the kind of 
freedom which was not possible under the Royal Family or the Mubarak regime in North 
Africa.    
5. Role of Jamat-e-Islami 
Under Zia’s reign, Jamat-e-Islami managed to gain a significant role in the 
Pakistani government.  During its early days in India, the group created a separation 
based on devout believers of the religion and those who were nominal in their faith.  The 
devout Muslims felt it was their duty to advocate a Muslim state and revert to a period of 
the Rashidun (the rightful leaders).62  In the 1980’s, the Jamat enjoyed a considerable 
status due to Zia’s own religious convictions and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.  
As a consequence, it strengthened the organization’s role and image as a political party.  
However, the fundamentalist teachings of the Brotherhood and Jamat, as they pertain to 
Afghanistan and FATA, can be traced back to the 1950s, inspiring Sibghatullah 
Mujaddedi, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Maulvi Yunus Khalis.63 
Over the course of Soviet invasion, the Jamat would become a suitable tool of the 
ISI and an umbrella organization for other religious groups since it offered an extension 
into Afghanistan.64  This would set the stage for subsequent Islamization of the FATA 
and NWFP as well as the increase in madrassas, giving birth to the frustrated Taliban 
who would utilize the Islamic concept of Shari’a (Islamic law) and state as their ultimate 
visions.  The consequences of the over-reliance on religion would surface in the success 
of the Taliban and the Jamat’s growing role in the Pakistani politics.  The dangers of 
Islamization would also be experienced through foreign entities craving to push their 
ideology into FATA areas.  The greatest lesson of this era, however, is in realizing the 
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adverse consequences of thrusting religious actors into political and strategic roles; 
religion is not well-versed in modern governance, economy, or foreign policy.      
6. Rise of Mullahs 
During 1980s, the area suffered a rise in Islamization, thus reducing the authority 
of the Maliks and Khans (tribal leaders with political roles) who had traditionally 
governed over their respective tribes.  The increase in religious madrassas and emphasis 
on Shari’a gave rise to the Mullahs (religious clerics) who began to infuse the clergy and 
political authority under themselves.  Over the last few decades their role only grew 
stronger.  The Jihad in Afghanistan and the resulting Taliban only strengthened their 
position in the FATA.  Enjoying autonomy and foreign aid from Wahabi donors, the 
madrassas were instrumental in the creation of militants who often served at the service 
of many Pakistani policies in the region, be it Kashmir or Afghanistan.  However, the 
events of 9/11 drove General Musharraf to change his domestic policies and implement 
actions that were geared to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  It has not been easy 
to reverse decades of policies which promoted asymmetrical warfare as a means for 
strategic depth against its neighbors. 
7. Creation of Taliban 
After the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet forces, Afghanistan was in a state of disarray 
with no economic and political stability.  The communist leader, Najibullah, remained in 
power until 1992, mostly due to the animosity and lack of organization between the 
Mujahideen groups, warlords, and factions.  Even though an attempt was made to unite 
the various ethnic tribes and control Kabul collectively, this too had failed by 1996.  Two 
years before this (in 1994), a group was organizing to become the next regime to change 
the dynamics of Afghanistan.  This group would come to be known as the Taliban (from 
the word Talib; Student).  Taliban members and leaders shared key ethnic and social 
factors which contributed to their cohesion and success.  The students traced their origins 
to Afghan refugee camps in the FATA and received their education and training in the 
religious madrassas which preached hard-line teachings of Islam.  Additionally, and most 
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importantly, they comprised of Pashtun identity, the dominant group in Afghanistan.  The 
fact that theses students knew little of their Afghan history or culture did not matter since 
they aimed to create a state in the traditions of early Islamic period, a type of Caliphate 
which would be free of corrupt groups who had now turned on each other to gain 
power.65  
With new forms of instability and widespread chaos in Afghanistan, Pakistan 
again grew concerned over its neighbor.  Pakistan’s then Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, 
had envisioned a trade route to Central Asia to improve the troubling economy of the 
country, a task which required a reliable ally to ensure the safety of its convoys. 66  With 
no other credible group, and given the growing fervor and rhetoric as the liberators of 
society, Taliban proved to be the only worthwhile partner.  This strategic alliance 
eventually led to the Taliban’s hold on Kabul two years later (in 1996).  “Politically, the 
Taliban gained small but significant status of international legitimacy through Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.67  Unfortunately, the irony quickly set in as 
these liberators turned into the most oppressive regime to rule Afghanistan.  Initially, the 
Taliban were welcomed for countering the thugs and criminals but their reliance on strict 
Shari’a practices and atrocities against females sent shockwaves throughout Afghanistan 
and the international community.  With alienation from the general international 
community and the United Nations, this isolated regime was ripe for the infiltration of 
Al-Qaeda, a new alliance that would give way to a host of global problems. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter probed the historical Afghan conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries.  
Past Afghan intrusions of a colonial power and a superpower showed that a weak state 
can win wars against a superior, more advanced military.  Furthermore, when widespread 
collateral damage violated the dearly-held concepts of nang, the locals resorted to 
insurgencies under the banner of Jihad.  Over the course of history, Afghanistan also 
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experienced the growing role of religious leaders during times of political turmoil.  This 
provided opportunity for outside actors to inject their own brand of Islam, as seen 
through the support of Saudi Arabia and FATA madrassas.  With Islam and badal as the 
motivating factors for the masses, the longer an invader fights, the stronger the 
insurgency, and more dangerous the resulting generation becomes.   
Lastly, the present and future solutions for the Afghan crisis are embedded in 
cultural understanding.  As shown by the examples of General Harlan and British 
Paladins, understanding Pashtunwali can mean the difference between cooperation and 
resistance.  The more an invading military educates itself about cultural elements such as 
badal and nang, the less likely it is to enrage the populace.  To ensure victories, the 
current and future battles must be fought across the spectrum of political, economic, 
social, and military spheres.68  Continuing to rely solely on military strategies while 
ignoring the effects of collateral damage is likely to repeat history.  
The next chapter will discuss the implications of Coalition’s military tactics.  The 
analysis will suggest that over-reliance on kinetic means has led to widespread collateral 
damage and has fueled anti-Western sentiment.  As a consequence, it has also heightened 
the effectiveness of Taliban’s propaganda campaigns, possibly increasing recruitment for 
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III. COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND BADAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the impact of collateral damage on the insurgency and 
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.  It will analyze how over-reliance on aerial strikes and 
lack of cultural knowledge by the United States and the NATO/ISAF Coalition have 
damaged the popular support, thus hindering with Coalition’s efforts to stabilize and 
reconstruct the countryside as well as implement a lasting solution where the elected 
government is able to survive.  Unfortunately, as the research will suggest, the current 
approach pursued by the Coalition has done more harm than good; ramifications of which 
may transpire in a long term involvement in the region while contending with a populace 
that sees the Coalition’s presence as an oppressive rather than a liberating force.   
Six years after embarking on Operation Enduring Freedom, the NATO forces are 
continuing to fight a resilient insurgency.  With Al-Qaeda leadership as elusive as ever, 
the Taliban have become the main adversary in Afghanistan.  Despite the kinetic tactics 
and state-of-the art technology at the Allies’ disposal, the insurgency seems to show no 
signs of weakening.  On the contrary, terrorist attacks are up “53 percent in Afghanistan, 
according to statistics compiled by the National Counterterrorism Center.”69  Given these 
startling figures, growing criticism is being expressed at the national level with regards to 
failures in what began as the primary front on terrorism.   As the Taliban insurgency 
continues to gain strength, the overwhelming response by the U.S. officials and military 
leadership has been articulated through the need to deploy more troops.  Little emphasis 
has been devoted to the underlying causes that may be fueling the Taliban insurgency; 
cultural elements of the Afghan people have been disregarded as they pertain to curbing 
the anti-U.S. sentiment and Taliban recruitment.  Furthermore, hindering the campaign of 
winning hearts and minds has been the ongoing collateral damage caused by the allies.   
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In order to discover the negative effects of the current military strategy, Taliban 
propaganda campaign will be studied to outline the anti-U.S. sentiment as it stems from 
the occurrences of innocent civilian deaths caused by Coalition strikes.  Additionally, 
propaganda will reveal that Pashtun culture (Pashtunwali) and Jihad (Holy War) have 
played a vital role in compromising the popular support; reactions to collateral damage.  
Violations of tribal customs and religion have led to shaping the Coalition forces’ image 
as occupiers, no different from the invaders who marched into Afghanistan before.  
Moreover, Taliban tactics have evolved to create further cultural and religious violations 
by the Coalition, pulling the friendly forces into creating additional collateral damage and 
dilemma in the very tasks the Coalition set out to accomplish.  In lieu of the growing 
insurgency and the ongoing civilian deaths, there may be grave implications for the future 
of United States national security and interests in South-Asia.  If the current military 
strategy in Afghanistan doesn’t change, the center-of-gravity (people) may favor the 
Taliban, in turn prolonging the conflict and depleting the American influence and 
economy through a war of attrition.  The following chart depicts the rising Coalition 
casualties since the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom.70  It includes hostile, training, 












U.S. Total= 469; Other Coalition Total=268; Grand Total=737 
Figure 3.   Number of Casualties 
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While the low number of casualties may appear to be an indicator of success 
given the scope of operations and years in the country, the rising pattern of casualties 
represents possible challenges from the insurgency.  Despite dedicating costly resources 
and over six years of military presence in the country, the insurgency seems to show no 
end.  As of November 2006, the cost of Afghanistan conflict was estimated to be $88 
billion dollars, not including the aid given to neighboring Pakistan for their assistance in 
the GWOT.71 
B. CONCEPT OF BADAL 
In any society the cause of collateral damage to human life carries the potential of 
creating resistance movements by invoking morality.  However, in a society like Pashtuns 
the effect is three-fold.  Not only is morality invoked through mere human emotion but 
tribal custom of nang (honor) and Jihad are also invoked.  These three factors combined 
not only motivate and create a Jihadi force unlike any other, but they also render the 
Coalition’s efforts useless in the face of very people it is trying to protect.  To best 
explain this loss of hearts and minds campaign, Pashtun tribal code must be studied; more 
specifically the concept of badal.  The word badal means revenge-killing or vendetta.  
“Badal is an action taken to avenge death, or when the honor of a woman has been 
involved. When it is a matter to be resolved by badal, the right to avenge by death is the 
prerogative of the individual immediately concerned, but that right also resides in the 
family, section, clan, or tribe.  Further, badal need not be restricted to action against the 
culprit, but can be taken against any member of his kinship group.”72  It is a tribal custom 
held high in Pashtunwali (Pashtun tribal culture).  Pashtunwali is unique to the Pashtu-
speaking tribes in Afghanistan who comprise of over 42 percent of the population; a 
separate percentage lives in the adjacent Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan 
(FATA).  Moreover, Taliban are Pashtu-speaking and adhere to these tribal customs in 
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addition to the religious guidance of Islam.  Generally speaking, offending the honor 
code of any majority, and especially that of a group which happens to be the opposing 
force and part of the most dominant tribe in Afghanistan, the issue is worth delving into 
and warrants closer attention.  The map depicts the areas occupied by Pashtuns. 
 
Figure 4.   Afghan Ethnic Map 
In comparison, the following map outlines the affected areas of military 
operations against the Taliban.73  The areas of struggle correlate to the Pashtun populace. 
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Figure 5.   Afghan Areas of Combat 
Pashtuns belong to a contact society where extended relationships and tribal 
interactions take precedence over the individual.  As such the honor of one affects the 
honor of the collective unit of family and tribe.  Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the 
individual to restore the honor of the family or tribe if insult should occur.  Among many 
factors in Pashtunwali, loss of life is at the hierarchy of nang violations and demands 
vendetta or some type of reconciliation to restore that honor, even if the loss of life was 
accidental.  Reconciliations are done through a Jirga (group of elders) to come to a 
mutual agreement, be it monetary or some other arrangement that satisfies the victim’s 
family.  In view of this very concept, it is apparent that Pashtuns are a society unlike any 
in the Western world and that closure is a very important concept which cannot be 
overlooked by the offender.  Even as a Muslim society, nang seems to take priority over 
the Islamic elements of mercy and forgiveness, often creating a contradiction between the 
two value systems.    
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C. COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
1. U.S. Tactics 
Having discussed the implications of badal, it is crucial to focus on the 
Coalition’s tactics with respect to how they have become counterproductive in the face of 
culture and insurgency.  Overall, the military tactics have depended primarily on 
technology to oppose the enemy.  As such the aerial assets have been the modes operates 
following a contact or skirmish with the Taliban forces.  A host of Close-Air-Support 
(CAS) aircrafts and bombers have been utilized in reaction to intelligence reports and 
ground support.  In one published case, the aircrafts have even been used interchangeably 
despite their intended roles.  For instance, according to the November 2007 Navy Times 
report, B-1B Lancer Bombers flew forty-one CAS missions in one day alone following 
the discovery of mechanical failures in the F-15 aircrafts.74  While this incident was 
hailed as a success story in terms of adaptability and reinforcement for the ground forces, 
the broader strategy alludes to a continued reliance on aerial bombers to provide roles 
that were traditionally accomplished with lighter payloads and closer proximity to the 
targets.  To qualify the previous statement, “the Air Force is bolstering this immediate 
strike capability” of “combining the payload, long-loiter, and high-altitude capacity of 
bombers with precision munitions, improved command and control, and precise 
targeting…to conduct CAS.”75  However, the precision capabilities of high-altitude 
munitions are negligible in the face of faulty intelligence and poor decision-making on 
the ground.  Even during the occasion of apologizing and handing out blood-money of 
$2000 per family for a ground-related episode of collateral damage (in March), an air 
strike killed at least 21 civilians in the southern province of Helmand later that day.76   
One month earlier in April “at least 57 civilians are said to have been slain in American 
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air-strikes at Shindand, in Western Afghanistan.”77  Unfortunately, even one death of a 
civilian is one too many given the cultural aspects of the affected tribes.   
2. Taliban Strategy 
Knowing the Coalition’s technological might and superiority, Taliban have 
maintained their unconventional tactics to lure the friendly forces into situations that 
promote collateral damage and reduce their ability to protect the civilian population.  The 
insurgents have largely sought to avoid full-on battlefield confrontations and instead 
relied on guerrilla-style tactics, including suicide attacks, roadside bombings and 
kidnappings.”78  These techniques may also be driven by the Coalition’s predictability of 
using air strikes and lack of cultural familiarity.  This is not to say the Taliban are free 
from collateral damage.  As of June 2007, the death toll for the period of 2006 and 2007 
amounted to 6,000 people with over 1,500 civilian casualties, bulk of which were 
attributed to suicide bombings and other insurgent activities.79  Nonetheless, it is the 
friendly forces that are held to the standards of international law and rules of engagement 
while Taliban are known to carry out human rights violations.  Additionally, the 
Taliban’s goal may not be to win hearts and minds for their own cause but to ensure that 
friendly forces are not able to do get the trust of the people.  In this regard, and knowing 
the nature and wrath of the aerial strikes, Taliban may intentionally be taking the fight 
into inhabited villages and residential dwellings.  Running into a village after an 
encounter with the Coalition forces has become routine activity for many Taliban 
fighters, knowing that an aerial attack will most likely follow the incident.  Sacrificing 
fighters may be a price worth paying for their political aspirations in comparison to the 
damage afflicted on the image of friendly forces.  “The death of innocent civilians during 
operations — numbering more than fifity by some accounts — has damaged trust and 
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fueled resentment, pushing some into the arms of terrorists, according to observers.”80  
According to Nader Nadery, vice president of the Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission, “the casualties are an easy propaganda tool for the Taliban to use in the 
affected areas.  People feel under attack by both sides.  This does not win hearts and 
minds.”81        
3. Perception 
The commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom began with the aims to free 
the oppressed Afghan people from a ruthless Taliban regime and to promote stability in 
order to disrupt the safe havens of Al-Qaeda.  In doing so, the American policy makers 
promised safety, security, and an improved quality-of-life for the people.  Six years later, 
the situation is anything but ideal.  More so than its inability to protect the people from 
Taliban atrocities, the innocent deaths caused by the Coalition forces are beginning to 
turn away the popular support initially enjoyed upon entry into the Afghan conflict.  The 
Coalition forces are no longer viewed as liberators but as a military that makes 
indiscriminate decisions in which people are acceptable losses.  Compounding the issue 
are the meager compensations and the rare apologies to the affected families, if any.  
These cultural violations, if not reduced and mediated appropriately through tribal 
customs, can only complicate matters.  As explored through the concept of badal, the 
honor of the entire family or clan is at stake and without reconciliation from both sides 
the only outlet for the insulted member(s) is to take revenge.  The lack of reconciliation 
not only paints the Coalition as an arrogant force but it also feeds the perception of an 
occupation where people feel victim to the oppression and injustices of the invading 
force. 
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D. JIHAD AND MADRASSAS 
Having perceived the Coalition’s presence as an environment of oppression and 
injustice, the concept of Jihad begins to surface in combination with badal, further 
aggravating the public’s resentment.  According to Islam, oppression and injustice are 
sufficient criteria to justify a Holy War against an invading non-Muslim force.  
Unfortunately, Jihad is being advocated at a lesser level than that declared by the state 
itself (Dar-ul-Harb).  This is a consequence of the fact that Afghans view Karzai as an 
extension of the West, similar to the historical events surrounding Shah Shuja and the 
first Anglo-Afghan war. The following Quranic verses highlight the basic criteria as it 
pertains to an armed struggle.   
Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress limits 
and slay them wherever ye catch them.  And turn them out from where 
they have turned you out; for persecution is worse than slaughter; but 
fight them not at the sacred Mosque unless they first fight you there; but if 
they fight you, slay them.  Such is the reward of those who reject faith.  
But if they cease, Allah is oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.  And fight them 
on until there is no more persecution.  And the religion becomes Allah's.  
But if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice 
oppression.82 
According to the above verses, there are elements of forgiveness and rules of 
engagement as to the termination of an armed struggle.  Whereas perception is reality, 
termination is dependent upon creation of an environment where the people no longer 
feel oppressed.  Until such circumstances exist, the struggle remains a mandatory act 
upon all Muslims, hence attracting support from outside actors who may wish to fulfill 
their obligations; bringing participants from all parts of the globe.        
After the context of Jihad is established, madrassas often carry out the duties of 
rallying the youth for the religious cause.  In the case of Afghanistan, the recruitment 
pool of Jihadis is abundant because of its proximity to the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.  Due to influx of refugees from the Soviet invasion and the 
present conflict, thousands have settled in the FATA despite its broken socio-economic 
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conditions.  It is also due to this poor quality-of-life that madrassas (schools) have 
become the primary mode of education system.  The type of education offered in most of 
these madrassas centers on religion alone.  Upon graduation from these religious centers 
the students become ripe for recruitment by the Taliban. When probing deeper into this 
phenomena, the problem is large enough to sustain an insurgency for years to come.  
Haqqani madrassa (in NWFP) alone produces over 3,000 graduates each year, whose sole 
purpose, in absence of other opportunities, will be to fight Jihad.83  Regrettably this issue 
is not limited to the FATA alone.  According to the Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan (HRCP) 2002 report, there were an approximate 28,000 madrassas in Pakistan 
with only 8000 of them registered.  By March 2002, there were around 600,000 students 
in 6000 registered madrassas.  Compared to the 4000 Taliban killed in 2006,84 even 1 
percent of the student population is ample to sustain the resistance in Afghanistan.   
E. INFORMATION WARFARE  
In an effort to restore the Coalition’s tarnished image, it is pertinent that collateral 
damage is reduced considerably while instituting an effective propaganda campaign to 
win back the hearts and minds of the people.  The current propaganda campaign lacks the 
depth required to change the resentment and perception of the people; it is not rooted in 
concepts of Pashtun culture and Islam.  The leaflets distributed throughout the region are 
often too simplistic and lack the moral fiber in comparison to the propaganda campaigns 
of the Taliban.  Following leaflets represent the typical format and content of many of the 
Coalition’s propaganda. 85 
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Figure 6.   U.S. Propaganda Leaflet 
 
Figure 7.   U.S. Propaganda Leaflet 
In the portrayed leaflets, the common theme is that of friendship between the 
Coalition forces and the people.  However, with continued collateral damage such 
propaganda may appear as a contradiction on part of the Coalition’s efforts.  Secondly, 
the honor and privacy of women (zan) are deeply-held values for the Pashtuns; concepts 
ignored by the propaganda.  To show Pashtun women’s faces, coupled with a comparison 
to the unveiled Western women, is a degradation of nang.  It is critical that future 
campaigns consider the culture and values of the people who are to be the intended 
targets of such leaflets.  
While the two portrayed leaflets offer gestures of friendship, there are numerous 
others that place their emphasis on monetary issues and wrath of the Coalition military.  
They either offer rewards (pictures of U.S. dollars) for the capture of targeted individuals 
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or show images such as an AC130 gunship approaching to eliminate human targets.86  In 
view of the collateral damage caused by the aerial strikes, it maybe worthwhile to omit 
images which many may view as the vehicles of indiscriminate death.  As seen through 
the Soviet invasion, technology did not deter the resistance, especially when that 
technology served as the tools for what the locals perceived as ruthless and brutal tactics.    
Whereas Coalition propaganda falls short on its emphasis on cultural and 
religious elements, the Taliban propaganda more than makes up for its reliance on local 
values.  The following Taliban leaflets, known as “Night Letters,” reveal the power and 
effectiveness gained from Pashtunwali, Islam, and collateral damage caused by the 
Coalition.87 
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. 
Figure 8.   Taliban Propaganda Leaflet 
Translation: “Pious Afghans, Brave and Courageous People! Accept our greetings; 
Dear Muslim and devout brother! As you all know some countries in the Islamic world 
and specifically our dear country-Afghanistan-are spending day and night under the grip 
of the crusaders in the last few years. During this time the cruel crusaders' army and 
their domestic servants have committed grave atrocities, barbarity and savagery against 
our innocent brothers and sisters. Their cruelties have not ceased. You have watched 
and heard of their ongoing savagery in Afghanistan and Iraq, the two best examples that 
have been exposed by the international media…” 
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Figure 9.   Taliban Propaganda Leaflet 
Translation: Message to the “Mujahed” (freedom fighter) Afghan Nation! You have 
served Islam a great deal throughout history and have defeated the non-Moslems of the 
world. Your ancestors such as Ahmad Shah Abdaali, Mahmood Ghaznawi, Shahaabuddin 
Ghori and other heroes have recorded a great history in fight against non-Moslems, but 
it is a pity that today some of America-trained servants under the name of bright-minded 
have destroyed the honored history of Afghanistan. Today once again your sons, clerics 
and Taliban and the faithful people, in these circumstances are fighting against non-
Moslems and are serving Islam. If you don’t do any thing else, at least support your 
Mujahed sons and do not be impressed by the false propaganda of non-Moslem enemies. 
God forbid one and half millions of martyrs of Jihad (religious Islamic fight) against 
Russians and one hundred thousand of martyrs of Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan 
(martyr Taliban) will ask you for the cost of their martyrdom, so we hope that you meet 
our expectations. They’re stopping the Islamic education and instead are teaching 
Christianity to your children. Taliban never want to kill common civilians, but 
unfortunately some so-called Afghanis have become the supporters of our enemies. Non- 
Moslems want to kill and pit Afghan against Afghan and in the name of Talib they are 
attacking everybody and they are killing Afghans and destroying your houses and they 
are destroying Islamic madrassahs in Afghanistan. They burn their Afghan arms and 
ammunitions. They want to make Afghanistan as helpless as Palestine. You have seen 
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that in all “Madrassas” (Islamic schools) nowadays they teach Christianity to your 
children. Once again, we request you not to support non-Moslems, otherwise you will 
have the whole responsibility here and hereafter. 
Be happy Poem 
I was so sad you laughed 
I was caring for Islam and you betrayed 
How do you call yourself an Afghan 
Instead of me you supported a non-Moslem 
 
Based on the above leaflets it is apparent that Taliban information campaigns 
revolve around perceptions and sentiments of those affected by the actions of the 
Coalition.  Not only are the Taliban campaigns more thorough but they incorporate 
aspects of honor, history, and tradition to summon the support of the people.  With the 
Soviet invasion not far from the memories of the Afghan people, they compare the 
atrocities of this conflict to the indiscriminate actions of the previous war, trying to draw 
parallels that may undermine the Coalition’s efforts.  Nonetheless, it is the Coalition who 
finds itself in a defensive stance, not only to counter the Taliban propaganda but to gain 
legitimacy from a populace that has begun to lose confidence in its efforts.  In the end it 
is the people who will determine victory or defeat; Taliban seem to know this fact while 
the “liberators” often appear to overlook the power of such information.    
F. STELLA MODEL 
This STELLA model takes key factual data and couples it with speculations to 
forecast the Taliban insurgency for the next 72 months.  It links collateral damage to the 
Taliban’s ability to affect public opinion and recruit fighters via madrassa population.  
The model only takes into account factors pertaining to civilian deaths, Taliban 
propaganda, recruitment, and Coalition’s kill rate.  Following facts were used to 
formulate the simulation. 
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• Coalition Kill Rate of 333 per month, based on 4,000 Taliban killed in 
2006.88 
• Civilian Death Rate of 52 per month, based on 314 civilian killed in the 
first six months of 2007.89 
• Madrassa Population of 600,000 based on the 6,000 of 8,000 registered 
madrassas in Pakistan; additional 22,000 madrassas’ population remains 
unaccounted for.90 
• Graduation Rate of 1 percent of 600,000 per year.  Recruitment Rate of 
less than 6000 Students per year due to possible attrition (less than 1 
percent of Madrassa Population).  In 2001, Pakistan's official figures 
report that “only one percent of madrassas sent their students for military 
training in Afghanistan.”91   
• Positive Perception of Coalition Behavior determined to be an important 
factor in countering Taliban Propaganda Effectiveness.  “According to a 
countrywide poll by the BBC, the number of Afghans who believe that 
their country is headed in the right direction dropped a precipitous 22 
percentage points between 2005 and 2006, from 77 percent to 55 percent, 
while the number of Afghans who approve of the U.S. presence in their 
country eroded from 68 percent to 57 percent. Meanwhile, Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly urged NATO and the U.S. military 
to act with greater restraint.”92 
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Figure 10.   STELLA Model 
1. Key Assumptions 
A).  Information Operations campaigns are critical to hindering with the Taliban  
propaganda. 
B).  Collateral damage boosts the Taliban propaganda campaigns while lowering 
the Coalition’s credibility.  Reduction in collateral damage and disruption of Taliban 
propaganda will improve the public opinion to a level of above 90 percent.C).  Collateral 
Damage cannot be completely eliminated.  
C).  Tactical restraint can reduce collateral damage.  Improvements are immediate 
(six months to accomplish; in reality it will take longer to change tactical operations and 
incorporate decision-making tools and/or resources).    
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D).  Actual stock of Taliban fighters and recruitment pool are larger than the 
STELLA figures.  STELLA figures are based on probable lower limits.  
2. Findings 
Though a simple simulation, exclusive of other contributing factors, it produced 
startling results as to the duration of the insurgency.  Based on the current Coalition’s 
Kill Rate and Taliban Recruitment Rate (stemming from the madrassas), the numbers 
favored the insurgency.  Despite assuming the Taliban Fighters to be at a low stock of 
5,000, the stock was not reduced to half until a period of six years; 23, 654 Taliban were 
Killed in 72 months.  The model also revealed another dilemma:  While Tactical 
Restraint is needed to reduce Collateral Damage, it may also reduce the Kill Rate 
needed to reduce the number of fighters.  In view of this, the only way to improve the 
Coalition’s perception while curbing the insurgency is to interfere with the Taliban’s 
recruitment.  However, interfering with the recruitment pool requires non-kinetic 
solutions.  There are no military solutions for reducing an enormous madrassa population 
in the borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  To accomplish the task of curbing 
the Taliban insurgency, solutions must appear in the broader policy and strategy towards 
Afghanistan.     
3. Applications 
The implications of these findings cannot be understated.  With a renewed 
emphasis on reducing collateral damage, restraint and improved decision-making at the 
operational level are instrumental to offsetting the factors which promote and sustain 
recruitment through propaganda stemming from the loss of innocent lives.  Without 
drastic improvements at the tactical level, the kinetic methods will continue to produce 
innocent civilian casualties, thus playing into the hands of Taliban.  It must be noted that 
improvements at the tactical level must not be limited to technology alone; they must 
extend down to the actual trigger-pullers in the battlefield environment.  Whereas culture 
and language are the overlooked factors in understanding the enemy, more is needed in 
terms of educating the fighting men and women as well as those in the upper echelons of 
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the tactical decisions.  It should be no surprise that Taliban guerilla tactics lure the 
Coalition forces into creating collateral damage, however, enhancements at the tactical 
level can provide increased situational awareness to the soldiers and the Combatant 
Commanders as to possible consequences of a strike on a fleeing or hidden Taliban 
target.  This added piece in the decision-making process can provide dividends to the 
overall strategy of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, especially since the military 
continues to desire the full effect of “kinetic weapons” to destroy the enemy while 
limiting the likelihood of collateral damage.93     
With regard to Information Operations (IO) campaigns, the efforts must 
incorporate culture, religion, and concerns of the locals.  The amount of information, 
when compared to Taliban leaflets, pales in comparison to a typical Coalition leaflet.  
Additionally, Coalition must take into account the unintended consequences that may 
stem from overlooked details such as Pashtu language or tribal dominance in 
Afghanistan.  Not only do such matters highlight the need for cultural experts, be it in the 
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) or in country, but revamping of the current 
Information Operations is also needed to counter and compete with the Taliban 
campaigns.   
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the implications of collateral damage and its impact on the 
Taliban insurgency.  It explored the links between insurgency and violations of 
Pashtunwali and Islam.  It also emphasized Pashtun people as the center-of-gravity 
through which victory may be attainable.  In order to achieve a positive outcome that is 
conducive to future stability of Afghanistan, Coalition forces must revamp their military 
strategy and adopt tactics that exercise restraint and are backed by cultural expertise to 
avoid creating resentment by the people.   In doing so the Coalition must avoid an over-
reliance on aerial strikes and turn its attention to building trust on the ground, be it 
through tribal elders or avoidance of unnecessary use of force.  Additionally, it must 
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develop an information campaign which is capable of defeating the Taliban propaganda.   
Finally, it must foster an environment which hinders with the concepts of badal and 
Jihad, tasks dependent on a rapid reduction in collateral damage and appropriate 
reconciliatory efforts.  And while collateral damage may not be reduced to zero, there 
must be drastic improvement to win back the hearts and minds of the people. 
The next chapter will concentrate on the socio-economic issues in FATA.  Even 
though it is but one arena in lowering the Taliban insurgency, it is a crucial factor for the 
present and future stability of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan.  The United States and the 
international community cannot afford to ignore the consequences stemming from 
ungoverned spaces, as seen through the recent assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the 
widespread domestic unrest in Pakistan.  By offering a mixture of socio-economic and 
political strategy to FATA, future recruitment pool of insurgents may be lowered as the 
quality-of-life increases.  In turn, a similar approach may be used to address the Taliban 
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IV. NON-KINETIC APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN: 
ADDRESSING ISSUES IN THE FATA   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having discussed the damaging effects of collateral damage, this chapter will 
outline a host of socio-economic and political factors to approach the Taliban insurgency.  
While the focus of previous chapters was on collateral damage stemming from the 
military campaigns in Afghanistan, this chapter will attempt to delineate an indirect 
approach to insurgency.  More specifically, it will address the turbulent Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan as catalysts to stabilizing Afghanistan.  Since 
FATA serves as a critical component for the Taliban recruitment, it may be the center-of-
gravity for stability in the region.  Also, it is important to note that possible solutions or 
policies must coincide with a drastic reduction in collateral damage on both sides of the 
border.  Without a reduction in collateral damage, any attempts to stabilize FATA may 
only result in costly failures and additional loss of lives.   
In order to forge possible solutions for FATA, research will explore its broken 
socio-economic and political systems.  It will highlight the fundamental problems that 
have plagued the inhabitants and led to its current role as a haven for many extremists.  
Neglected infrastructure as well as a poor quality-of-life will be exposed to show why 
this region has been an attractive hub for extremism and illicit activities.  Research will 






























Figure 11.   FATA Map 
B. GOVERNMENT NEGLECTS 
1. Poor Quality-of-Life 
The 10,510 square miles area is home to over six million, along with significant 
number of refugees who have settled there since the onset of Soviet invasion in 1979.  
When probing deeper into the dynamics of FATA, it can be concluded that extremism 
offered the only attractive outlet for many youth who otherwise could not be gainfully 
employed elsewhere.  Due to large number of youth and a broken education system, 
madrassas have become the only institutions of education, taking in children from ages 
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five to their teens.94  For many parents’ point of view, madrassas offer a valuable service 
since the students are able to learn while receiving three meals a day; eliminating the 
burden on part of the parents in a region where poverty is abundant and job opportunities 
scarce, if any.  Unfortunately, since the 1980’s most madrassas have taught a religious 
curriculum with no emphasis on modern, more applicable education. An attempt to 
modernize madrassa education and to incorporate females into the student populace has 
been challenging, often resulting in rocketing or bombing of the particular madrassa.95  
Graduating with a strict emphasis on Islam, the students are mentally prepared to take up 
arms in Jihad, making them susceptible to the exploits of the Taliban and other Jihadi 
groups.  “The Child Soldiers Global Report 2001 said that around 20,000 children below 
eighteen were recruited by madrassas in Pakistan to fight in Afghanistan. The report 
quoted Pakistan's official figures as saying that only one percent of madrassas sent their 
students for military training in Afghanistan.”96  This figure may have risen in the wake 
of growing insurgency in Afghanistan but even 20,000 is significant number, more than 
sufficient to sustain the Taliban recruitment efforts.   
Infrastructure of FATA is also a reflection of its neglects by the broader domestic 
politics and policies in Pakistan.  The area is stricken with lack of basic social services, 
resembling more an Afghan region than a territory of Pakistan.  Adequate health and 
security systems do not exist to maintain any quality-of-life.  Naturally, the inhabitants 
find themselves sympathizing with their tribes and families to the West rather than the 
country they reside in.  The lack of security also makes fertile grounds for the influence 
of local and foreign militants.  “Government officials who have spent time in the tribal 
areas say there may be as many as 1,000 foreign militants there, but because many have 
intermarried and raised families, their status as foreigners is somewhat blurred.”97  These 
very reasons lead many to believe that Al-Qaeda leadership may have blended into 
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lawless regions of the FATA.  “The Federally Administered Tribal Agency has 7,000 
‘Khasadar’ (local police) for about four million people. These forces are considered 
inadequate, although the North West Frontier Province can also call on the services of the 
17,000 members of the Frontier Constabulary.”98  For Pakistani forces to gain any 
positive influence and credibility, basic human services must be provided in order to give 
locals an incentive to oust the radical elements from their society.  For now, the FATA is 
a place plagued with the kind of issues that are practically unheard of from the 
perspective of a citizen in the West.  As of December 2006, “135 out of every 1,000 
children under the age of five died early, often due to chest infections, diarrhea, or other 
treatable ailments.  For every 1,000 child births, six mothers died, often because quality 
medical assistance was not available.”99 Clearly, there is much room for progress in 
winning the support from a region that gave birth to the Taliban and may be continuing to 
support its endeavors.   
Insurgency and terrorism are not the only outlets in FATA.  “In the absence of 
viable options to earn a living, the lure of illicit activities such as smuggling (consumer 
goods, weapons) and drug trafficking is as difficult to resist as the call of extremist 
Islamist elements.”100 Such occupations are driven out of necessity as well as consumer 
demand.  Unemployment, in combination with lack of security and education, make a 
dangerous recipe for illegal activities.  Refugees have also contributed to these issues. 
Despite having repatriated over 2.5 million refugees, over one million still remain in the 
area.101  Until the basic day-to-day issues are addressed, all efforts towards the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT) may render themselves useless.  Without restoring stability 
and basic human necessities, the hearts and minds may be difficult to win at best. 
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2. Drugs 
The border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan serve as critical drug routes 
for smugglers.  The network of drug mafia enjoys a multi-billion dollar industry which 
disrupts the state’s ability to control and enforce laws in the already unstable area.102  
The instability works in the favor of the drug smugglers by providing outlets for labs and 
clients. It is estimated that over half of Afghanistan’s Opium is smuggled through 
Pakistan.103  And while the entire state of Pakistan cannot be summed up as a “narco 
state,” the FATA and the adjacent North West Frontier Province (NWFP) can be labeled 
as such due to their breakdown of law and order amidst being of critical value for the 
drug network.  With drugs making an already bad area non-conducive to the Coalition’s 
efforts to root out radical forces, the war on terrorism must have another and equal front – 
a war on drugs.  In 2004 alone, there were an estimated 3.5 to 5 million drug users within 
Pakistan, in many ways creating the kind of demand that attracts suppliers to the West of 
the border.104  Drugs not only hinder with Pakistani efforts to reform the area but they 
offer motives to keep the chaos alive for the survival of illegal industry.  This indirectly 
contributes to the extremists who may discover new alliances with the drug smugglers by 
virtue of a common enemy.  Unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan has a capable government and 
the revenue to offer viable options in place of the drug business; it’s a matter of 
acknowledging the severity of the problem and then addressing it with feasible options.   
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Map from Geopium Website: http://www.pa-chouvy.org/indexcartes.html 
Figure 12.   Drug Smuggling Routes (Map) 
C. CURRENT APPROACH 
In an effort to enforce its domestic policies, assist the Coalition forces, and reform 
the FATA system of governance, Pakistan has deployed over 100,000 troops to the areas 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The task has not proved easy since the military has 
met armed attacks from the local tribes.  Bulk of the resistance has materialized in the 
Waziristan area (the most volatile regions in the FATA).  Fierce clashes coupled with 
suicide attacks have killed 250 people in the month of July (2007) alone.105  As of 
December 2006, Pakistani military has lost over 750 troops while trying to hunt for 
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terrorists.106   The question then arises, has this strategy produced any results in the quest 
to revive the Maliks or will a different method yield a better outcome? Many feel that the 
current approach has further radicalized the area, resulting in a scenario where the 
military is in constant confrontation with the clerics while the traditional leaders and civil 
servants have become even weaker.107  
The costly ordeal, which has been bloodier than the loss of American troops in 
Afghanistan, suggests that the present Pakistani policy will continue to encounter 
resistance from the locals.  Even the 100,000 troops in FATA have fell inferior in the face 
of locals.  According to Pajhwok Afghan News (September 3, 2007), the latest ambush of 
a Pakistani military convoy in Waziristan resulted in the capture of over 300 security 
personnel, making it one the most embarrassing incidents thus far.  This not only 
highlights the difficulty of conducting operations in the FATA but shows the resilience of 
the extremists who have managed to capture the assets and weaponry of a formal army 
unit. 
1. Death of Innocent 
The broader implications of the struggle in FATA, however, are also attributed to 
collateral damage.   In an already alienated region, innocent civilian deaths have invoked 
Jihad even against a Muslim state.  The implications of citizens rising against their 
government may have far greater dangers since theology has come in confrontation with 
secularism, thus dividing the populace of Pakistan while creating civil unrest in a country 
that enjoyed a fair amount of domestic peace prior to the tragic events of September 11, 
2001.  Given this tension between the religious and secular forces, two radical ideals 
come into view.  First ideal is the religious groups’ quest to overtake and run the state, as 
was the case with Khomeini’s Islamic revolution in Iran.  Second, Syed Qutb’s 
philosophies surface amidst the struggle in Pakistan, in that use of force and Jihad are 
sanctioned against one’s own Muslim state.  Combined, the two create a recipe for 
disaster for the long term stability of Pakistan.  In view of these implications, the kinetic 
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means must halt in order to diffuse the two radical ideologies.   The following excerpts 
from a 2004 propaganda video filmed in Waziristan, lend credibility to the issues 
pertaining to collateral damage and Jihad:108 
Parvez’s army, instead of removing their burnt vehicles and collecting the 
dead, brought more artillery.  They used thousands of rounds against true 
Muslims and made thousands of innocent children cry, and made many 
holes in the beautiful mud houses.  This ignited the Muslims of the area 
who rushed to the streets and attacked all military convoys who were 
entering the area, as a result of which 8 big vehicles were burnt and tens 
of soldiers killed; others fled.  
Finally Parvez’s army warned people of the area to abandon their houses 
or else be bombed.  When these Muslims were taken out of their houses, 
they bombed all these convoys of departing people.   
Hey military soldiers, how did your dignity allow you to bomb Muslim 
houses?  Who do you believe in?  Almighty Allah, Bush, Blair, or Parvez?  
These are traitors who eliminated your history.  You were those who 
people used to salute but now they fight you.  Why?  Think a little about 
what you are doing.  Muslims of the world were proud of your power.  
People expected that you would free the Holy Land Jerusalem.  They 
expected you would protect the Holy Land (Mecca & Medina).  You 
obtained atomic power to protect Muslims but now you kill Muslims in 
order to protect atomic bombs.  You make a reverse history.  What would 
historians write about you?  As Islamic military or Crusader military?  
O Believers, do not make friendships with Jews and Christians.  Amongst 
you some make friends with them and they will be counted as one of them.   
O killers of Muslims, come and repent for your actions.  Allah is 
forgiving; otherwise He will destroy you, or you will be killed at the hands 
of Muslims and Almighty will send you to hell, a very bad place.   
Come and make Jihad. 
2. Dilemma of the Pakistani Army 
 By all practical purposes, the Pakistani army is in confrontation with religious 
extremists who view themselves as fighting Jihad against the near enemy.  Coupled with 
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badal and Holy War, the resulting domestic instability has created unique challenges for 
the army and its role in a counterinsurgency.  The Pakistani army was not designed to 
fight internal insurgencies, but rather focus on outside threats such as its rival India.  The 
events of 9/11, however, have not only brought a Muslim military in confrontation with 
its own citizens it once supported for Jihad during the Soviet invasion (which may in 
itself carry psychological affects on the fighting men as well as a reversal of role for the 
army), but it has also tested the very capabilities and training of the army.  According to 
Lieutenant General Mohammed Hamid Khan, President of Pakistan’s National Defense 
University and a former Combatant Commander for the Frontier Corps, the long term 
policy in the FATA must involve non-kinetic solutions; the incidents of collateral damage 
and poor quality-of-life alone have aggravated the anti-government sentiment in the 
FATA.109  Such acknowledgments, while giving credence to non-kinetic solutions, may 
also reveal rifts amongst commanders on the ground and broader government policies 
pertaining to the GWOT and support of the Coalition.  Continuing on the current kinetic 
path is likely to create further animosity towards the Pakistani army and the government.  
3. Repercussions of Kinetic Methods 
 There seems to be an assumption that uniformity of kinetic strategy is needed to 
counter the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Further, ongoing debates 
within the American political arena assert that Pakistan has not dedicated sufficient 
resources and efforts to root out terrorism from the FATA, thus blaming many of the 
failures in Afghanistan on the actions of the Pakistani military.  However, when 
comparing the domestic issues of the two states, there is little room to employ the 
strategy in Afghanistan to the rugged areas of FATA.  Additionally, the resulting 
instability must also be compared since two different consequences are likely to occur 
from the kinetic means.  From the Afghan perspective, outside forces (U.S. and NATO) 
are engaged with an enemy that played a role in the events leading up to 9/11.  From the 
Pakistani perspective, the government has revamped policies that once used the very 
populace it must now contend with.  The repercussions also differ due the immediacy of 
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the problem.  When badal and collateral damage are the underlying issues, the concept of 
revenge is more relevant for Pakistan than it is for the outside forces in Afghanistan.  
Though an angry generation may be left behind in the wake of a future withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, should the conflict subside, the U.S. and NATO forces will enjoy the safety 
afforded by a physical geographic separation.  Pakistan, on the other hand, will be left to 
police an angry populace it must govern for the sake of creating domestic harmony.   
With suicide bombings on the rise and Pashtun nationalism more vocal than ever, the 
Pakistani military must be afforded to carve its own strategy; one that balances military 
objectives as well as their aftermath.   Pressuring the Pakistani regime to employ tactics 
used by the U.S. and NATO forces may jeopardize the legitimacy of the newly elected 
government.  
D. THE WAY FORWARD 
1. Promoting Pakistani Nationalism 
In light of the broken socio-economic systems, alienation of the Pashtuns, and 
extremism, Pakistan can no longer afford to keep FATA separated from the mainstream 
politics and national economy.  Be it drug mafias or terrorists, too much control has been 
lost due to history of the region and the trends in criminality.  A separate system of 
governance is no longer feasible for FATA, as the Malik system too will keep the region 
alienated as it had before the rise of Mullahs.  Two extreme forms of government are not 
conducive to the functions of any state.  The FATA Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) 
may have been useful under the British, where a master-subject relationship existed, but 
the same cannot be true for a state trying to reform its populace and bring it into the 
mainstream society.  The mere nature of FCR stems from mass punishment of an entire 
tribe, possibly leading to further aggravation if enforced by the Pakistani government.  
Maintaining this outdated system of governance will only keep the classic ethnic 
stereotypes alive, specifically the Punjabi-Pashtun tensions that have lasted since the 
British and Ranjit Singh’s rule over Punjab.  A divided system will confirm the Punjabi 
domination of national politics and economy in the eyes of the Pashtuns.  This same 
belief led to East Pakistan revolts, the 1971 War and the secession of Bangladesh.  
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Besides, failures to absorb the Pashtuns into mainstream society, politics, and economy 
may also keep the concept of a separate Pashtunistan alive (a separate state carved out of 
the FATA areas), a prospect which the Pakistani government cannot afford to consider as 
it would cripple the state, reducing it to half the territory it holds today.    
2. Modern Education  
Clearly many of the FATA problems have stemmed from maddrassas and heavy 
emphasis on religion.  The lack of practical education has led to lowered prospects of 
opportunities for the overwhelming number of youth, in turn leading them to the luster of 
illegal activities.  The literacy rates are also indicative of the overall social-ills of the 
region.  Female literacy rates are especially alarming. There is a great disparity between 
the FATA literacy rates and the remainder of Pakistan.  
In addition to instituting a modern education, government must also monitor and 
register the maddrassas to track their curriculums and agenda. Madrassas initially 
sprouted to offer education in remote areas where government influence, resources, or 
transportation were unreachable.  However, since 1979 the madrassas may have far 
exceeded the scope of necessity.  “There are an approximate 28,000 madrassas in 
Pakistan with only 8000 of them registered.  According to the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) 2002 report, by March 2002, there were around 
600,000 students in 6000 registered madrassas with more than 250,000 students in Punjab 
alone. The proliferation of madrassas began in the 1980s and continued in the 1990s. 
Compared to their number in 1979, when there were less than 2000 madrassas, their 
growth has been tremendous. They are now seen and portrayed as 
fundamentalistinstitutions and breeding grounds for militants to wage a Jihad all over the 
world. From being established centers of learning in the middle-ages, they have traveled 
a long way.”110 
                                                 




Figure 13.   Literacy Rates 
3. Agriculture 
When dealing with issues related to Opium, the war on drugs must accompany 
agricultural developments to be of success.  For now the drug markets and smuggling 
may offer lucrative incentives for many who may not have any other source of income.  
With only 8 percent of land cultivated and 3 percent irrigated, providing feasible crops 
and irrigation must occur before the issue of drugs is fully enforced.  Taking away the 
illicit market without providing reasonable substitution will only aggravate those who are 
entrenched in this occupation, be it for profit or basic livelihood..   
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Though agricultural projects will require time to institute various crops based on 
harvests and seasons, they are the best solutions for gradually reducing the Opium 
market.  Also, the projects will require tremendous monetary resources to erect the 
infrastructure needed to bring about a positive change.  Some may argue that Pakistan 
does not have the financial resources or allocations to carry out such projects due their 
reliance on United States as it pertains to the War on Terrorism. However, research 
suggests otherwise.  According to the U.S. State Department, “Pakistan has publicly 
expressed its support to Afghanistan's President Karzai and has pledged $100 million 
toward Afghanistan's reconstruction.”111  Despite this generous offer, the large sum of 
money may best be spent on the broken and turbulent regions of the FATA.  As evident 
through the various socio-economic systems and poor quality-of-life, the most immediate 
concern for the Pakistani regime should be the FATA regions that have compounded the 
insurgency on both side of the border. 
  
                                                 
111 U.S. State Department Website, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm.  
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Figure 14.   FATA Land Utilization 
4. Reconciliation 
Lastly, none of these measures can be achieved without certain level of diplomacy 
and cooperation from the locals in FATA.  As seen through the Pakistani military’s 
experience, the kinetic methods have only widened the gap between FATA and 
mainstream Pakistan.  They have also led to domestic instability for the country, creating 
challenges associated with fighting an internal insurgency, a mission which the Pakistani 
forces were not designed to carry out.   To reduce future instability, Pakistani government 
must pursue reconciliatory efforts within FATA.  Based on previous chapters, the damage 
caused by the Pakistani forces must be addressed through tribal code of Pashtunwali, be it 
in terms of forming alliances with moderate elders in the tribes or payments of blood-
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money to the families of collateral damage victims; Pakistani forces, too, are guilty of 
collateral damage.  Like the Taliban organization, the resisting forces in FATA are not 
monolithic and may be susceptible to agreements for the broader good of the region and 
country.   An entire society or region must not stay isolated from the remainder of the 
state based on the actions of radical element within them.  Winning the trust of the locals 
may prove to be the best aid in ousting extremism from FATA.  Like the British Paladins 
earlier in the century, local cooperation will go a long way for the stability of the region.  
Even backdoor diplomacy must not be ruled out. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter recognized FATA as the pivotal factor in curbing the Taliban 
insurgency in not only Afghanistan but also in Pakistan.  Over time, the neglected regions 
had become ripe for the intrusions of outside actors and served as conduits for illegal 
activities and terrorism.  The affects of alienation and the subsequent induction of radical 
religion transformed FATA into a recruitment pool for the Taliban and other extremists.  
The cross-border incursions continue to disrupt the security of Afghanistan since the 
collateral damage from military strikes allows the Taliban propaganda to flourish among 
the youth and non-gainfully employed populace of the FATA. 
The research also identified the broken systems which can be repaired to increase 
the quality-of-life and offer alternatives to the thousands of youth who may otherwise 
become targets of the Taliban recruitment efforts.  By nationalizing the FATA region and 
offering socio-economic opportunities, the Pakistani government may win the favor of 
the locals. Since the military strategy has done more harm than good and mirrors the 
Coalition’s failures to the West, the real solution may be imbedded in reconciliation with 
the moderate forces as well as bringing the region into modernity similar to the 
mainstream Pakistan.  Whereas the Malik system is already destroyed by the Mullahs, 
only the authority of the state can transform the region, without which FATA will 
continue to be a volatile point of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Not only 
do the Taliban trace their origins to FATA but they also have supporters within these 
lawless regions; Coalition forces cannot cross into this area due to sovereignty factors.  
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Saving FATA may pay dividends to the security in Afghanistan, granted the collateral 
damage is dramatically reduced to hinder with the credibility and recruitment campaigns 












The Coalition has entered its seventh year in Afghanistan since the events of 
September 11, 2001.  The initial aims of the military intervention in Afghanistan were to 
capture the Al-Qaida leadership, topple a tyrannical Taliban regime, and liberate an 
oppressed populace.  Until now the Al-Qaida leadership remains elusive while the 
Coalition is engaged in countering a resilient Taliban insurgency.  As the stability of the 
region continues to deteriorate, the situation warrants a closer examination of the 
Coalition’s actions to discover where mistakes might have been made; certain military 
actions have hindered with the Coalition’s goals and have aggravated the insurgency. 
By studying the culture of the Pashtuns, research concluded that the current 
military tactics have done more harm than good.  Contrary to the Coalition’s premise, 
technological superiority and mass didn’t prove useful in the face of tribal customs.  
More specifically, the issue of collateral damage provided the fuel for many Taliban 
propaganda campaigns, worsening the anti-Western sentiment.  The death of innocent 
civilians have led to mistrust of the Coalition while creating a perception of oppression 
and injustice, key requirements for invoking badal and Jihad. Concept of revenge, 
coupled with Holy War, has been the underlying theme behind the loss of hearts and 
minds campaign in Afghanistan.  Simply put, neglects in Pashtunwali (tribal customs of 
Pashtuns) have led to compounding the insurgency.  Additionally, people’s role as the 
key center-of-gravity has been ignored, further damaging the Coalition’s image and 
hindering with objectives for stabilizing and securing Afghanistan. 
To prove the relationship between the Pashtun concept of revenge and insurgency, 
research analyzed the past Afghan wars.  Two Anglo-Afghan wars and the Soviet 
invasion set the basis for discovering similar trends in the past.  All three wars revealed 
that invading Afghanistan proved easy but controlling the insurgencies that ensued 
became the ultimate challenges for the British as well as the Soviet militaries.  While the 
Soviet invasion was the most ruthless in terms of weaponry and tactics, collateral damage 
and poor treatment of the Afghans was a common trend in all the past conflicts.  Each 
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conflict managed to spark an insurgency once the invaders marched in and settled into the 
country.  In addition to reviving the concept of badal, the banner of Jihad was also 
erected to fight a common enemy. 
The past also revealed a gradual reversion to mainstream Islam.  Whereas many 
Afghans practiced Sufiism and a moderate school of thought, the outside invasions 
invoked Jihad and increased the role of the clergy, especially during times of political 
vacuums and puppet regimes.  After the Soviets invaded, a radical type of Islam found its 
way into the Afghan society since an outside actor, Saudi Arabia, brought financial 
assistance as well as their brand of fundamentalist religion.  The widespread collateral 
damage also managed to temporarily unite the tribes in a common fight against the 
oppressor.  Colonial and Soviet interferences showed that a puppet regime could only 
survive as long as the invader was in the country to protect him.  Puppet leaders were 
killed after the invading militaries’ withdrawal, as the populace viewed them as 
extensions of the invaders.  Past invasions also revealed that a society which views 
revenge and Holy War as dearly-held value systems can become a force to reckon with if 
diplomacy or alternative means do not exist to foster reconciliation based on those values.   
Another consequence of the Soviet invasion emerged in the form of instability in 
FATA, Pakistan.  FATA became the gateway into Afghanistan for many outside militants 
during the Soviet invasion.  By American definition, FATA could easily be comparable 
to the “Wild-Wild West” of the 1800’s.  The area’s breakdown of law and order, 
alienation from mainstream Pakistan, broken social systems, drug smugglers, and the 
abundance of firearms made it ripe for illegal activities.  The flood of radical Mullahs 
added a new dimension to its volatility.  The resulting religious maddrassas produced the 
kind of fanatic students who would not only take up arms for Jihad but also serve as the 
recruits for extremists like Taliban and Al-Qaida.  The tribal affiliations and Pashtunwali 
concepts of malmastia (hospitality) and nanawatay (refuge) made FATA a haven for 
cross-border incursion during and after the Soviet war, including the insurgency faced by 
the Coalition today.  In short, FATA has long become a source of new recruits and an 
oasis for those wanting to elude authorities, especially since any formal military in 
Afghanistan cannot cross into Pakistan without violating international rules. 
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Much like the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Coalition too is frustrated by the role of 
FATA and its significance for the Taliban.  This very significance has not only sparked 
blame between the neighboring countries but has also disrupted the domestic stability in 
Pakistan.  In FATA, much like in Afghanistan, a battle is raging to weed out the 
extremists.  And similar to the collateral damage issues in Afghanistan, Pakistani military 
is also facing the brunt of the people’s rage due Pashtunwali violations.  In practicality, 
FATA has acted more like a part of Afghanistan than Pakistan due to its tribal affiliations 
with the Pashtuns to the West.  Consequently a home-grown Pakistani Taliban has also 
surfaced in the wake of Musharraf’s support towards the GWOT.   
Unraveling the current and past Afghan conflicts consistently revealed the 
contention over the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Hence, the solution 
to curbing the Taliban insurgency is two-fold.  First and foremost, the Coalition must 
drastically reduce collateral damage since it boasters the Taliban’s propaganda and 
recruitment campaigns while hindering with the very goals that prompted Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  Secondly, the FATA’s contributions to the Taliban must be 
addressed.  Any efforts of the U.S. and its allies are futile as long as an ungoverned space 
with radical madrassas continues to produce abundance of students, many of whom will 
have no outlet in life but to join the ranks of militancy due to lack of opportunities, 
employment, and modern education.    
In light of the problems plaguing the region, the solution must come in non-
kinetic means.  It must also be consistent with the goals of the Coalition and recognize 
people as the critical factors in defeating the insurgency.  As the Coalition takes measures 
to reduce the loss of innocent lives, it must support a non-kinetic solution in FATA.  The 
military opposition to FATA has further angered the locals and has resulted in domestic 
disturbances in the country.  The 2007 Red Mosque incident showed how real the danger 
is.  The security of both nations is in jeopardy as long as FATA follows the model of 
separate government system and suffers neglects from the Pakistani government.  
Evidence suggests there are far too many ailments in the tribal areas; military 
intervention doesn’t bring about those fixes but rather promotes resistance.  For the 
Pakistani military, the border is too vast and rugged to be patrolled; waging battle against 
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a society where practically every male carries the equivalent of an AK-47 rifle is merely 
fanning the flames of instability and making an already dangerous area attractive for 
future terrorists.  For the sake of the maintaining a key ally for the GWOT and fostering 
success in Afghanistan, the long-term security in FATA must revolve around quality-of-
life, instead of loss of life. 
Having acknowledged the FATA as pivotal to the security on both sides of the 
border, research pointed to a number of broken systems that contributed to the anarchy 
and illicit lifestyles of the locals in those regions.  At the hierarchy of needs were the 
basic systems like security, irrigation, health care, and education.  These pitfalls not only 
encouraged illegal activities like terrorism and Opium smuggling but they also alienated 
the tribes from the remainder of Pakistan.  Given the elements of Pashtunwali and tribal 
affiliations, the locals naturally felt closer to Afghanistan.  The tribal ties and the link 
between smuggling and terrorism cannot be overlooked in the dynamics of security in 
South-Asia.  
With the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) now a freely elected government, the era 
of American-Musharraf alliance has come to an end.  In the new scheme of politics, there 
are new challenges that must be addressed to counter the issues of FATA and insurgency.  
The new regime is not likely to repeat the patterns which made Musharraf a steadfast 
opponent of the Mullahs while creating unpopularity in the country.  The PPP may 
embrace an approach which aims to diffuse the tensions created by the last regime as it 
pertains to the army’s role in patrolling the FATA.  In doing so it may also fuel the 
historic strains between the PPP and the army leadership.  As such, new strategies and 
obstacles may come to view in order to ensure the survival of a democratically elected 
party.  In turn this may cause apprehensions for the United States and NATO since the 
future solutions may border on measures which place the Coalition’s objectives as 
secondary to the survival of the regime. 
The path to stability in Afghanistan depends on the principles that include a 
spectrum of solutions.  Whereas insurgencies have a political and a military element, the 
solutions too must address those factors.  Thus far the solutions have been heavily reliant 
on military tactics, results of which have appeared in the form of collateral damage and 
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loss of trust from the locals.  To ensure a lasting success, Coalition must explore the 
political and social aspects of winning the hearts and minds from the populace it claims 
to have liberated from the clutches of the Taliban.  It must not underestimate the power of 
diplomacy, be it a backdoor diplomacy channels to seek out the moderates within the 
Taliban or other groups in the FATA.  Coalition’s success is critical to curbing future 
terrorism.  Being the primary front in the War on Terrorism, a defeat in Afghanistan or 
Pakistan may not only compromise the security of South-Asia but it may have deadly 
consequences for the broader international community as well, possibly encouraging the 
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